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1. Executive Summary 
 
“Civil society members only offer advice. They are like a cancer on the 
society. This parasite … the cancer named civil society must be 
uprooted from the society”1 
 
1. Since its transition to democracy in the early 1990s, Bangladesh has made significant 
progress in terms of socio-economic development and growth.  The country has benefitted 
from a combination of macroeconomic stability, GDP growth, increased revenues from 
remittance, continued reductions in levels of poverty and extreme poverty, and notable 
progress against the majority of Millennium Development Goals targets. Bangladesh is now 
ranked 142 out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index, and the UN has placed it 
among the 18 countries making the fastest progress in human development.  
 
2. Despite the progress, key challenges remain. The population continues to grow while the land 
reduces. Recent estimates predict that the county will lose 11% of its land by 2050. Moreover 
with population growth, the absolute number of people living in poverty and extreme poverty 
remains very high; inequality continues to rise; the spatial distribution of poverty is uneven; 
and Bangladesh remains one of the most food insecure countries in the world. 
 
3. More recently however the challenge which causes most concern is Bangladesh’s poor record 
on governance, corruption and the protection of social-political rights. The political 
environment in Bangladesh is characterised by a partisan and winner takes all mentality; 
political opposition and dissent is increasingly met with force and violence, and the 
accountability of duty bearers to citizens is very weak. 
 
4. Bangladesh has a long history of successfully implementing poverty reduction programmes. 
The Government of Bangladesh supports a large number of social protection programmes, 
including social safety nets, which are designed specifically to assist the most disadvantaged 
in society including women, children, the elderly and disabled. During the 2011-2012 
financial year, the Government allocated around 14% of the national budget for these 
programmes. 
 
                                                     
1 On 9 February 2015, local media reported that the Food Minister of the Government of Bangladesh 
had made this statement at a programme in Dhaka.  See http://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/omg-
63877 
 5 
5. The NGO sector in Bangladesh is one of the most renowned in the world and one of the 
largest. It is a key player in the task of reducing poverty and enhancing wellbeing, and has 
been at the forefront globally of innovation in microfinance, group mobilisation, income and 
employment generation support, and civil society strengthening and action. 
 
6. The relation between Government and NGOs has always been tense and problematic, with 
periods of outright hostility and mistrust. The NGO sector is accused - mostly by government 
officials - of being ineffective, inefficient and beholden to donor/international agendas. At the 
same time, the government is often the target of NGO mobilisation especially in relation to 
issues around governance, rights and entitlements. The relation between Government and 
NGOs is further complicated because the latter in particular rely ultimately on political allies 
and support in order to carry out their activities. Inevitably this means that NGOs are exposed 
to and have to engage with the imperatives of partisanship and patronage, which underpin the 
wider political environment.    
 
7. Given its size, the NGO sector is the most visible civil society actor in Bangladesh. Its 
relation to civil society however is not without tensions. On the one hand, the visibility of the 
NGO sector has meant that civil society has to some extent been restructured away from an 
array of indigenous interest groups and is now more associated with a narrower combination 
of development-orientated objectives such as service delivery, group mobilisation and 
advocacy. Some argue that this subverts genuine civil society grassroots activism. On the 
other hand, the NGO sector is accused by other civil society actors of being too close to 
Government and of competing with each other for external funding. This all creates conflict 
within civil society and weakens the collective efficacy of the sector.  
 
8. The MFS 11 study covers a two-year period from 2012 to 2014. This has been a particularly 
turbulent period in Bangladesh’s recent history. The country’s two main political parties have 
been locked in a ferocious political battle with the opposition regularly calling a series of 
strikes, hartals and blockades which have led to widespread violence, disruption and 
instability. The opposition party refused to participate in the 2014 elections, and has since 
thrown its energy into mobilising a movement to oust the government. This has resulted in 
increased levels of disruption and violence, and an escalation in the use of state forces to 
suppress all forms of opposition, often labelling it ‘terrorism’. As we submit this report, the 
situation remains precarious and the future very uncertain.  
 
9. The role of civil society and the room for manoeuvre in this period of turbulence is equally 
uncertain. Any opposition is perceived as a direct threat, including non-partisan opposition. 
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The phrase attributed to the Food Minister reproduced at the head of our report gives some 
indication of the levels of mistrust, antagonism and suspicion. 
 
10. The prevailing political and structural conditions have profound implications for the MFS 11 
evaluation, and makes the task of identifying and making sense of casual links between SPO 
activities and observed outcomes extremely challenging. In short, the scope for effective and 
impactful SPO activity over the past two years has been very limited. In log frame terms, the 
right hand ‘assumptions’ column has overwhelmed the implied causation through a theory of 
change between inputs, outputs and outcomes.  
 
11. The Netherlands has a long tradition of public support for civilateral development 
cooperation, going back to the 1960s. The Co-Financing System (Medefinancieringsstelsel, or 
‘MFS’) is its most recent expression. MFS II is the 2011-2015 grant framework for Co-
Financing Agencies (CFAs), which is directed at achieving a sustainable reduction in poverty 
and is the successor to MFS I, which covered 2007-2010. A total of 20 consortia of Dutch 
CFAs have been awarded €1.9 billion in MFS II grants by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MoFa). The MFS II Evaluation consists of a baseline (2012) and follow up survey 
(2014) to a) assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of development interventions 
funded by MFS II; b) develop and apply innovative methodologies for the evaluations of 
development interventions; c) provide justified recommendations that enable Dutch CFAs 
and/or their Southern partners to draw lessons for future development interventions.  
 
12. The MFS II Evaluation covers three priority results areas: a) MDG achievement, b) Capacity 
Development and c) Strengthening Civil Society.  
 
13. Over the period under review, MFS II supported just over 60 SPOs in Bangladesh. For our 
Evaluation, 4 projects were pre-selected for the MDG component, 5 pre-selected for Capacity 
Development and we selected 16 for Strengthening Civil Society. The selected SPOs capture 
a range of development interventions, different scales of operation and varying levels of MFS 
II funding and support.  
 
14. In our evaluation, we have adopted an important distinction, which is applicable to the NGO 
sector more generally. We therefore distinguish between NGO strategies of intermediation 
and mobilisation. In the former, NGOs act on behalf of or represent the interests of their 
respective beneficiaries or clients. This strategy comes into play when NGOs fill gaps in 
public services. In the mobilization strategy, beneficiaries themselves should have the 
capacities developed to represent themselves directly. This strategy comes into play when 
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NGOs aim to compel duty bearers to be more accountable to citizens, i.e. transform political 
structures. Over time in Bangladesh, NGOs have tended to veer more towards the 
intermediation strategy, partly because it reflects programme opportunities and partly because 
mobilisation strategies require more time and resources.  
 
15. For the MDG component, ‘before-after’, ‘project-control comparison’, and ‘difference-in-
differences’ methods were used to assess the impacts of the projects. This was complemented 
by group discussions and individual interviews. Where possible, we adopted 
control/comparison groups.  For the Capacity Development component, our methods were 
anchored in an intensive case study approach, which consisted of scoring against 5 
organisational capabilities and an inductive contribution style analysis, which built on reports 
of positive and negative impact of SPOs. In the Strengthening Civil Society, we applied 
CIVICUS scores to all selected SPOs and then focussed on developing 5 ‘thick case studies’ 
using contribution analysis. In cases where SPOs were selected for more than one of the 
components, we joined up our analysis.  
 
16. One of the Evaluation’s aims was to develop and apply innovative methodologies for the 
evaluations of development interventions. The MDG component has followed a rigorous 
control group analysis and adopted standard statistical techniques. Findings were triangulated 
with qualitative interviews and observations. For the capacity development component, the 
innovation of the methodology lay in the combination of an inductive organisational 
assessment and a contribution analysis anchored in impact analysis. Both exercises were 
highly participatory and involved a wide range of stakeholders. In many ways this 
approximates a more sophisticated ‘most significant change’ type approach.  The value of the 
approach is that it can be used at the end of projects but also during project implementation. 
This form of assessment not only evaluates capacity but in its implementation, actually 
contributes significantly to capacity development. The Strengthening Civil Society 
component combined CIVICUS scores and detailed ‘thick’ case studies. In Bangladesh there 
are no national CIVICUS studies and therefore it proved difficult to benchmark MFS SPO 
results. The case studies were built around a contribution analysis approach and proved to be 
insightful. In particular out attempt to numerically test alternative assumptions was innovative 
and contributes to the growing literature on ‘contribution analysis’. Again the approach was 
high participatory; and again is agile enough to be implemented during as well as at start/end 
points of a project. In both capacity development and strengthening civil society components, 
we successfully incorporated deep qualitative observations in a rigorous, systematic and 
transparent manner. These approaches could be used in future development interventions 
assessments.  
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17. The four projects evaluated under the MDG component all resulted in clear positive changes 
in the lives and livelihoods of beneficiaries. These positive changes include increased 
incomes; reduced levels of poverty; improved educational attainment; greater access to 
sanitation; and higher scores recorded under empowerment of women. Beyond these 
outcomes, there have also been notable improvements in more sensitive areas such as reduced 
dowry payments; knowledge around early marriage and pregnancy; awareness of gender 
equality, as well as the rights and entitlement of young women and girls; and knowledge of 
sexual reproductive health.  
 
18. Our evaluation of the Capacity Development component resulted in a more mixed picture, 
and a more difficult one to assess. Whilst on the one hand, there were numerically 
insignificant changes to the overall aggregate scores of the five capabilities (adapt and renew; 
act and commit; deliver on development objectives; relate to external stakeholders; achieve 
coherence), there were some changes for some SPOs in the capabilities’ sub-items. Given the 
short timeframe of the review, this is not an unusual outcome and should not be seen as a 
negative assessment of MFS II support. Indeed in general we observed good levels of 
capacity in the SPOs we visited. It is also possible that in some cases, MFS II funding may 
not have made much of a contribution to this existing capacity. However, our capacity 
development analysis revealed some interesting observations around ‘reverse capacity 
development’ which reinforces the idea of capacity maturity among SPOs, and some 
provoking insights into the consequences of withdrawing support from SPOs.  
 
19. Achieving observable impact in strengthening civil society is a lengthy process and of course 
as an outcome, is more likely to be affected by the external environment. In general the 
CIVICUS scores over the 2012-2014 period show a positive trend, and SPOs demonstrate 
particular strengths in civic engagement, practice of values and perception of impact. Even in 
cases where SPOs take risks in pursuit of rights based agendas, the scores are positive. 
Furthermore SPOs that are more “membership based or membership owned”, tend to score 
higher than other SPOs. This we believe is because the processes of including target groups in 
analysis and strategy is relatively easier and the costs associated with it are lower. Scores tend 
to decline or stagnate in cases where funding has either stopped completely or has been 
reduced significantly. The one average CIVICUS score, which declined was environment. 
This would initially reinforce our analysis that SPOs are currently operating under hostile 
conditions. The case studies are rich in detail and in general point to the significance of 
successfully negotiating with local socio-political in order to implement programmes. 
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Moreover it is clear that MFS II is supporting some innovative programme developments 
such as Girl Power which engage with deep structural/cultural inequalities.  
 
20.  The assessment was asked to evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of 
development interventions funded by MFS II. The efficiency question referred to the MDG 
component. We examined efficiency in broad terms, i.e. we assessed whether the intended 
output had been achieved within the budget and project time frame. We can confirm that all 
of the SPOs achieved their planned outputs. We are therefore confident to state that the SPOs 
have been efficient. For the four MDG projects, two (A1 and A4) will only be completed in 
2015. It therefore does not make much sense to carry out further efficiency analysis. For 
project A3, the MFS II budget was very relatively small (around 10%) and the project was 
complex involving significant social mobilisation ambitions. As such again it did not make 
much sense to pursue a detailed quantitative efficiency test. For the final project (A2), the 
project had been completed before the baseline had been carried out. On all MDG projects, 
we carried rigorous Difference in Difference analysis. These allow us to infer some 
statistically significant positive outcomes given despite the short span of evaluation period in 
question, which in turn allow us to indicate that outputs have been effective. Our best analysis 
of the efficiency of the capacity development and strengthening civil society components is 
that in general there is good evidence of progress towards planned outputs or that planned 
outputs have been achieved. On the whole, we consider this level of progress positive. It is of 
course impossible to make any summary statement about the relevance of the different SPO 
interventions. The range of activities supported through MFS II is quite broad and there are a 
large number of SPOs supported. All of the projects we assessed, seem to be well connected 
to a MDG theme, and there is a mixture of more ‘traditional’ activities (support for 
livelihoods) with more innovative ones (Girl Power). Many of the latter in particular could be 
considered ‘path breaking’ in Bangladesh.  
 
21. Finally the review was also asked to provide justified recommendations that enable Dutch 
CFAs and/or their Southern partners to draw lessons for future development interventions. 
Specific recommendations appear in the technical papers and so we confine ourselves here to 
some broader observations  
 
I. Given the political landscape in which SPOs have had to operate over the past two 
years, the fact that they have achieved positive results in all three components is an 
indication of effectiveness, resilience and innovation. In general, we observed 
positive results for SPOs adopting intermediation as well as mobilisation strategies 
in delivering planned outputs. Almost all sectors in Bangladesh have suffered as 
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result of the ongoing political tensions and turmoil. The NGO sector is not immune 
to the same setbacks and frustrations, and it is therefore to their credit that they 
have been able to operate successfully.  
 
II. The nature of the CFA-SPO relationship and the levels of funding commitments 
have a strong influence upon the SPOs and their capacity to achieve expected 
outcomes. Here, we argue, lies a core problem of donor resolve and morality – a 
problem which was brought home to us during the evaluation. SPOs in Bangladesh 
take far greater and higher risks than donors. Where long term stability and support 
are not signalled, SPOs are exposed and the effectiveness of any development 
investment is jeopardised. One clear recommendation therefore is that partnerships 
with SPOs need to be long-term. This does not preclude performance assessments 
but does imply a commitment which will enable meaningful capacity development 
and strengthening civil society.  
 
III. We have attempted to engage directly with the question of attribution. In social 
sciences, this is a complex and challenging question. In Bangladesh, the funding 
support to SPOs is in some cases relatively modest. Moreover in many cases, MFS 
II offers modest support to quite mature SPOs with large programmes and long 
standing histories of successfully implementing development projects. In cases 
when either or both of these conditions occur, tracing impact and asserting 
attribution are complex tasks. We observed in too many cases, that project design 
was carried out without thinking sufficiently about impact monitoring. As a result 
we are convinced that the fuller impacts of some implemented projects are not 
captured. We would recommend that impact considerations are fully embedded 
into project design and that this takes place at the very start of any project proposal 
– and certainly before the project starts.  
 
IV. The observation that the MFS II portfolio in Bangladesh consists of relatively 
modest amounts of funding provided to mature SPOs with established project 
portfolios, leads to a second more strategic decision about whether future 
investments should be ‘spread thinly’ or ‘concentrated’ in fewer areas of 
intervention. On the one hand, by spreading thinly and investing in established 
large programmes, MFS II has in some regards ‘picked good winners’. On the 
other hand, the contribution of MFS II in impact terms is not always easy to 
discern. We do not feel in a position to make specific recommendations in this 
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regard but feel it is a key strategic decision which requires deliberate consideration 
in the future.  
 
V. Dutch CFAs have a very good reputation in Bangladesh and are seen as effective 
development partners. For this reason perhaps, and at a very general level, we 
observed that the SPO projects were well designed, relevant to country context, and 
in some cases very innovative.  
 
VI. We observed a range of practices in terms of the quality of the relationship between 
CFAs and SPOs, with examples of excellent collaboration but also of poor 
communication and weaker partnership. The structure which brings CFAs together 
in alliances can allow for a sharper development focus around core priority themes 
and as such, can enhance mutual learning and development effectiveness. We have 
been able to observe this in our Evaluation. The alliance structure can also however 
become quite messy with partners in Bangladesh not entirely clear about lines of 
communication, mutual obligations and ultimately accountability.  
 
VII. The commitment to MDG delivery, capacity development and strengthening civil 
society meant that in principle, there were three separate streams of funds to 
support activities pertaining to the three components. In most cases this did not 
happen in reality. Often funding for capacity development and strengthening civil 
society were subsumed under other activities or funding streams. In the end it was 
not possible to separate the three components out. In the future, if there is a 
commitment to a number of results priority areas, it is important from the outset to 
have greater clarity about the funding of each priority. This is especially relevant 
when relatively modest amounts of funding are provided.  
 
VIII. There is an expectation that SPOs ‘owned’ their theories of change and were 
familiar with the logical connections between inputs, activities, outputs and 
outcomes. In too many cases, we observed that SPOs were not clear about theories 
of change, and were not able to clarify relations between MFS II funding, CFA 
involvement and the development/articulation of their theories of change. This is 
not a criticism of the SPOs but an argument which reinforces the need for greater 
support for capacity development.  
 
IX. The commitment to strengthening civil society is a key component of MFS II. We 
were however surprised at how little there was in terms of training or capacity 
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building in this regard. This is an area where CFAs actually have expertise and it is 
an area where the alliance structure might well be suited. We would recommend 
that in the future, more attention is given to building capacity to strengthen civil 
society.  
 
X. Finally, we want to end with a summary statement. We have observed that longer 
term relationships and partnerships lead to more effective outcomes and 
satisfaction. We observed this even in cases where long term partnership came with 
reduced financial commitments.  It is important, in attribution terms, to capture the 
effects of these longer-term commitments and partnerships. In our view: the 
overall MFS11 objective of strengthening civil society as a building block for 
structural poverty reduction is best served through long-term, regular and 
flexible support for SPOs. In our evaluation we have seen that CFAs are in a 
strong position to deliver on this.  
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2. Relevant Country Context 
 
“Civil society members only offer advice. They are like a cancer on the 
society. This parasite … the cancer named civil society must be 
uprooted from the society”2 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Baseline report offered a summary of context for that time (2012) which was more 
descriptive than analytical. For this final report, a more analytical approach is expected in 
order to understand the ‘space’ or ‘room for manoeuvre’ for civil society to flourish with the 
support of international donors like the Dutch government, through their network of CFAs. In 
‘logframe’ terms, this might be considered as the ‘assumptions’ column, which frames the 
prospects of outputs leading towards preferred or intended outcomes. 
 
In important respects, the context for civil society in Bangladesh has changed significantly 
even in the two year research period 2012-14. The political context has changed dramatically 
and will continue to shape the next 4 years, but with uncertain outcomes (see later part of this 
context section). Let us first revisit the longer term context within which more recent changes 
have occurred. This involves reminding the reader of some of the trend analysis in the earlier 
baseline report. 
 
Bangladesh has a population of about 150 million with an area of only 144,000 square 
kilometres which makes the country the most densely populated country in the world barring 
a few small city states like Singapore. The Bangladesh economy has experienced both 
macroeconomic stability and modest economic growth following its transition to a democratic 
process in the early 1990s. The economy registered an average GDP growth of around 6 per 
cent in recent years (Table 1). However, the rate of inflation has gone up to the level of two 
digits in recent times, affecting lives and livelihoods, particularly of the poor and the 
vulnerable.  
 
The incidence of poverty (including moderate and extreme poverty) has declined in 
Bangladesh over the past several years (Table 2). As the estimates indicate, income poverty 
has declined from 56.6% in 1991-92 to 40.0% in 2005 and 31.5% in 2010. Similarly, extreme 
poverty has also declined substantially during the same period. However, nearly one-third of 
                                                     
2 On 9 February 2015, local media reported that the Food Minister of the Government of Bangladesh 
had made this statement at a programme in Dhaka.  See http://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/omg-
63877 
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the population of 150 million people in Bangladesh still lives below the national poverty line 
and extreme poverty remains at 17%, according to the 2010 Bangladesh Household Income 
Expenditure Survey (BBS 2010). With such a high incidence of poverty, the government as 
well as non-government organizations and development partners are active in implementing 
various anti-poverty and social programs to help the poor and the poorest. 
 
2.2 Macro-economic stability, MDG progress and challenges 
Nevertheless, Bangladesh has huge potential and has consistently managed strong growth 
rates over the last 10-15 years. In our 2012 report, we referred to some exciting indicators of 
this potential including Goldman Sachs listing Bangladesh in their ‘Next 11’ economies 
(DFID 2011); and the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Survey ranking Bangladesh 
122nd out of 183 countries, and 5th of the 8 south Asia countries (World Bank 2012). The 
Doing Business 2015 data for Bangladesh is not so positive. It falls to 176th place out of 189 
economies and is now 7th of the 8 South Asian countries. (World Bank 2015). Over the years 
this ranking has been gradually deteriorating: 110 in 2009 to 118 in 2011 to 122 in 2011. The 
cost of starting a business, problems associated with construction permits and protecting 
investors are all areas which cause concern. According to the 2012 Index of Economic 
Freedom, Bangladesh’s poor business environment is undermined by a corrupt and inefficient 
regulatory regime which is heavily politicised (Heritage Foundation 2012).  
 
Foreign investments remain relatively low but on the rise with success in the garment, jute, 
leather, frozen fish and seafood sectors.  Revenues from remittances are highly significant. In 
2011 they constituted 10% of GDP, and according to 2012-2015 data from the Bank of 
Bangladesh, they continue to increase, exceeding many foreign exchange inflows, including 
official development assistance and net earnings from exports. Present levels of political 
disputation and violence will likely act as a depressor on this potential. 
 
Broad-based private sector led growth and macroeconomic stability have enabled Bangladesh 
to make considerable development progress. It is ranked 142 out of 187 countries in the 2014 
Human Development Index, up 4 places since 2011 and representing between 65% and 70% 
change against its comparable 1980 value. The general consensus is that Bangladesh has met 
MDG1 of halving extreme poverty by 2015; MDG2 on universal primary education has been 
achieved even if drop-out rates remain high; MDG 3 on gender parity in education is well on 
track; and infant mortality has declined significantly. 
 
However there remain key challenges:  
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 The population continues to grow while land reduces. With a projected 0.5 metre rise 
in sea levels, Bangladesh is likely to lose 11 % of its land by 2050 (UNDP 2011);  
 High levels of poverty persist with 32% of the population classified as poor, and 17% 
classified as extreme poor (BBS 2010);  
 The country has not performed well in redressing inequality. In 2010, the inequality 
of per-capita income stood at 0.458, in 2005 it was 0.467. This is likely to impact 
Bangladesh society as it moves to Middle Income Country status; 
 The spatial distribution of poverty is uneven and highly significant (BBS 2009, Ali 
2009);  
 Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to natural disasters and already experiences the 
negative impacts of climate change. The fourth IPPC Assessment report predicts 
significant increases in flooding and droughts in the future; 
 Continuing political turmoil involving widespread disruptions to economic activity.  
 
2.3 Agriculture and Food Security 
While the overall contribution of the agricultural sector to the national economy has fallen as 
the industrial, construction and service sectors have grown, its overall significance should not 
be underestimated. The sector remains extremely important for ensuring food security and 
because it engages around 65% of the country’s workforce. The World Bank Poverty 
Assessment Report 2000-2010 (2012) attributes the greater proportion of poverty reduction to 
agricultural labour and recent rises in real wage rates. Although Bangladesh has significantly 
increased its domestic food production, inadequate food access remains a major problem. 
Thus Bangladesh remains a highly food insecure country and is ranked 70th out of 81 
countries in the 2011 Global Hunger Index (IFPRI 2011), with 16% of the population 
classified as undernourished (FAO et al 2010). Incidences of food insecurity are not evenly 
spread across the population and reflect social and cultural norms. Thus higher levels of 
underweight, stunting, wasting and anaemia deficiency are found consistently among women, 
adolescent girls and young children. A key uncertainty in current food security assessments is 
the impact of the latest round of food price increases. 
 
2.4 Tracking social indicators3 and MDGs 
Bangladesh is a signatory to the Millennium Declaration at the Millennium Summit held in 
September 2000 along with 189 nations. The Summit adopted eight specific goals, known as 
                                                     
3 Most of the studies published in the last 2 years report on official data available up to 2010. This is 
when Bangladesh published its last Household Income and Expenditure Survey. 
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‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs), for human development and poverty reduction. 
The government also prepared earlier the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and a 
sixth Five Year Plan with the primary objective of reducing poverty by half by 2015. The 
government is committed to bring about changes in the social development of the poor that 
goes much beyond meeting material needs alone. 
 
Current status and changes over time (1990 to 2007/10) of selected social indicators in 
Bangladesh are presented in Table 3. Child nutritional status reveals that a high proportion 
of children in the country are currently suffering from malnutrition. It is true for both the 
measures of underweight (41%) and stunted (43%). In both measures, rural children are 
lagging far behind than their urban counterparts. Trends however show improvement for both 
underweight and stunted children over the same period. The percentage of children 
underweight has declined from 68 in 1990 to 41 in 2010. Likewise, the percentage of children 
stunted has declined from 64 to 43 during the same period.  
 
The mortality indicators have improved over the last 2 decades though they are still fairly 
high. Under-five Mortality has declined from 151 in 1990 to 73 in 2010. Infant mortality has 
also declined from 94 to 41 during the same period. Access to safe drinking water is 
satisfactory at its current state (97.8). However, arsenic contamination is now a great threat to 
safe water and therefore the definition of access to 'safe water' needs to be reviewed and re-
estimated given the arsenic contamination in the water. Only about 54.1% of the total 
population has access to a sanitary toilet is still very poor.  
 
Bangladesh has invested considerably in its health sector and this has contributed to some 
success in relation to MDGS 4, 5 and 6. Over the last decade, approximately 3.2% of GDP 
has been spent on health and the per capita health expenditure is US$ 12 (GoB 2009). One of 
the main challenges remains the scarcity of health professionals especially nurses; and where 
capacity exists, it is significantly biased to urban centres. Government sources have 
acknowledged the inequity in health care expenditure with the poorest spending less on 
health; as well as the spatially unequal distribution of health provision (GoB 2009). 
Nevertheless, Bangladesh is on track to meet the under-five and infant mortality and 
children’s immunization MDG targets, although the former will be impacted if children’s 
malnutrition rates deteriorate. There has always been serious concerns about Bangladesh’ 
track-record on improving maternal health. A recent survey however shows progress over the 
last decade, giving rise to cautious optimism (GoB 2010). While there is also evidence of 
reductions in prevalence of TB and malaria, it is clear that this MDG remains a challenge. 
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There appears to be a rise in dengue fever, with debilitating consequences especially after 
first onset. 
 
Though the literacy rate has increased from 32.4% in 1990 to 57.91% in 2010, it is still fairly 
low compared to other developing countries. While male literacy remains higher than for 
females, the rate of progress of female literacy is much higher implying convergence between 
the two in this respect. Net primary school enrolment has also improved significantly over the 
last decade. While the net primary enrolment was 60 in 1990, it was about 85 in 2010. There 
is little difference between boys and girls in this respect, with girls’ enrolment now just higher 
than for boys. Increasing attention is now focussing on ‘schooling’ (i.e. quality) as opposed to 
‘enrolment’. In this, Bangladesh’s performance is not as strong. 
 
The HDR 2013 results for gender equity in Bangladesh are especially encouraging with new 
maternal mortality rates indicating significant improvements on its Gender Inequality Index. 
This puts Bangladesh among the strongest improving countries in terms of ensuring equity for 
women. Bangladesh however remains a highly patriarchal society, resulting in considerable 
gender gaps in almost all development indicators, discrimination at all levels of society, and 
constraints for women accessing/ controlling resources that would reduce their vulnerability. 
Women have low levels of protection in the family as they do not have equal rights in 
marriage, divorce, guardianship, custody or inheritance. Women in Bangladesh also have low 
levels of physical protection, with violence against women being a common but largely 
under-reported occurrence. Early marriages and dowry practices are major factors in domestic 
violence, and there are increasing reports of sexual harassment, rape and assault occurring in 
work places and institutional settings. The number of reported cases of acid throwing has also 
been increasing at an alarming rate. Traditional norms and social practices place further 
constraints on women’s participation in activities outside of the home. Although the 
Constitution affirms equal rights, local norms bear strongly on the ability of women to access 
employment and education opportunities, and to take on visible or public roles either in 
politics or in business.  
 
2.5 Social Protection 
Bangladesh has a long history of implementation of anti-poverty programmes. Rural Public 
Works Programmes (RPWP) has been an important policy instrument for the government 
since the early 1960s to augment employment and income of the rural poor during the lean 
agricultural season. It has been in operation in one form or other with varying degrees of 
emphasis for a long time. These have morphed into several other programmes including the 
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Food for Work (FFW), Vulnerable Group Development (VGD), construction and 
maintenance of rural infrastructure, directed at generating employment opportunities for the 
rural poor.  
 
The government is currently implementing over 100 different social protection programmes 
(including social safety nets) through 24 different ministries/departments in order to support 
the disadvantaged people including women, children, elderly, and disabled. These programs 
include: cash transfer programs; food security programs; micro credit for self-employment; 
and funds for poverty alleviation. In order to support these programmes, an allocation of 
nearly Tk.226 billion was made in the financial year 2011-12, which accounts for about 14 % 
of the national budget and 2.5% of the country’s GDP. Some of the important cash transfer 
programs include: 100 days employment generation scheme, old age allowance, widow 
allowance, disability allowance. Major food assistance programs include: Food for Work, 
VGD, Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF), and others. There are also other conditional cash 
transfer programmes especially connected to the expansion of education and primary school 
enrolment. Both government and the NGO sector are involved in such CCTs. 
 
Various studies point out that the existing social safety net programs (SSNs) in Bangladesh 
provide limited coverage which cannot cope with the magnitude of extreme poverty and 
marginality that exists in the country. The SSNs cover about 15 million people – well short of 
the 24 million people who belong to the ‘extreme poor’ category.  Furthermore, the SSNs 
cover mostly the rural poor, whereas the number of urban extreme poor is also large and the 
nature of urban poverty is more severe than rural poverty in certain respects. This plethora of 
programmes is currently under review with the intention of streamlining and targeting them 
more precisely upon the poor. 
 
2.6 Anti-poverty: the rationale for NGOs 
The NGO sector in Bangladesh is famous worldwide for its involvement in poverty reduction 
programmes particularly through microfinance, group mobilisation and income and 
employment generation support. While it is true, as noted above, that local government 
structures provide social safety net schemes, these are easily distorted in their purpose 
through capture by local elites using funds for patronage. With Bangladesh’s poor record on 
governance, corruption, social and political rights, alongside intense need and historical 
dependence upon donors, development NGOs (e.g. the SPOs of the CFAs supported by the 
Dutch aid programme) have an anti-poverty stance as their major rationale for existence, 
attracting donor support as a means to avoid aid being misused by successive unaccountable 
 19 
governments. Hence the relation between government and NGOs has always been inherently 
tense and problematic (see below). Ironically, development NGOs have usually prospered 
better under military and technocratic regimes than democratic ones as the former regimes 
have needed legitimation outside party politics and mechanisms to reach out to the 
countryside, and more latterly urban slums. 
 
2.7 Socio-political context for civil society 
Since its independence, Bangladesh has experienced a dramatic transition from a 
predominantly agrarian society, characterised by patron-client relations comprising landlords, 
tenants and high proportion of landless labourers. While remaining predominantly rural, it 
now has a few large urban centres, with the capital, Dhaka, reaching mega-city status, 
accompanied by an increasing density of infrastructure through road networks which link the 
countryside to cities, and economic activity to ports and exports (especially through the rapid 
rise of the garments industry). However, Bangladesh retains a poor record on governance, 
corruption (ranked second by Transparency International), social and political rights. 
Accountability of duty bearers to citizens is very weak. Its organisational culture is dominated 
by ‘deep structures’ derived from its recent agrarian past (see Wood 2000, 2011, 2012). Large 
kinship groups straddle government and private sectors, with an element of rotation as 
incumbent governing political parties are voted out of office. Official decisions cannot be 
protected from private interests, with many appointments and transactions hidden from view.  
 
Civil society organisations are as embedded as other institutions (government and private) in 
the social imperatives of these deeper structures, needing to honour expectations and 
obligations from within large kin groupings and friendship networks. Civil society 
organisations thus have a major challenge in confronting problems of governance, rights and 
entitlements, when they themselves can be shown to be contaminated. However, beneath this 
general picture, the experience is varied, with some NGOs professionalising their activities 
and practices often at the behest of their international donors. They are subject to regular audit 
and review where problems are exposed. They have received advice and training in their own 
recruitment practices and MIS, as well as M&E (capacity building). Thus in the NGO sector 
more specifically, there remain some strong examples of success, alongside examples of 
failure and collapse, as deep structures have effectively captured their mission.  
 
The capacity of government to regulate the sector, for example through the NGO Affairs 
Bureau, is undermined and de-legitimated by corruption at the highest levels of government 
itself. This leaves a fundamental problem in society regarding the accountability of NGOs. 
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The better funded and operationally significant NGOs have thus tended to be more 
accountable to their donors than to their clients or other members of Bangladesh society 
(Devine 2006, 2009). This has been a source of great resentment among politicians, who 
perceive NGOs as loose cannons without statutory responsibilities. Even ‘successful’ NGOs 
struggle against this criticism and therefore need political allies and friends, which draws 
them into the deep structures problem. There is, therefore, fluidity in state-civil society 
relationships in Bangladesh, especially with the ‘sub-sector’ of development NGOs. While a 
few may be sufficiently large, like BRAC, to be able to manage these aspects of the hostile 
environment, especially as some politicians seek legitimacy through association, the majority, 
often regional and local ones, face a daily contestation of principles and values between the 
clashing expectations of deep structures and internationally set standards of professionalism. 
The SPOs supported by Dutch aid via CFAs fall into this category. 
Bangladesh has had a relatively short and turbulent political history, but also a rich history of 
civil society organization and activity including village based co-operatives, religious 
organizations, business associations, professional groups, trade unions, peasant organizations, 
student groups and the media). However it is the NGO sector which has come to dominate 
recent discussions on civil society. NGOs have operated in Bangladesh since Independence in 
1971, but over the last 30 years have grown dramatically due to the influence and support of 
foreign aid and the limited success of the government to reduce poverty and provide social 
services (Devine 2003). Today there are over 26,000 legally registered NGOs in Bangladesh, 
making it one of the largest NGO sectors in the world.  Most of these are local and voluntary, 
but some have multi-million pound budgets and manage large commercial ventures.  
 
Since the early 1980s, development oriented NGOs in Bangladesh, significantly funded by 
external donors, have re-structured civil society away from a more indigenous array of 
professional, labour union, peasant association and other sectional interest groups which 
previously negotiated with the state within a corporatist framework. Southern Partner 
Organisations-SPOs 4(in MFS11 language) have, in effect, re-defined civil society towards a 
combination of service delivery, social mobilisation, lobbying and advocacy wherein 
educated activists (increasingly professionalised) have mobilised resources to act on behalf of 
poor clients towards government (in terms of rights and entitlements) and policy choices (in 
terms of public resource distribution). 
 
                                                     
4 SPO is an unfamiliar term in Bangladesh and people refer much more to NGO. To be consistent with 
the MFS II language we will use SPO when relevant/possible to refer to the NGO activities funded by 
MFSII. Outside of this we use the term NGO as it is broadly understood in Bangladesh. 
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Some nationalist critiques of this process have argued that these externally funded SPOs are, 
in effect, crowding out more indigenous forms of social capital, by introducing a Western ‘de 
Tocquevillian’ agenda in which civil society acts as a corrective to the inherent 
unaccountability of the state. This agenda constructs civil society more in terms of 
mobilisation, advocacy and lobbying. More especially in Muslim Bangladesh, an inclusive 
notion of ‘ummah’ offers an ontological alternative by seeing the domains of state and civil 
society as permeable, rather than separated, in which civil society is constructed more in 
terms of intermediation, through service delivery. Over the years, there has been a general 
shift within the NGO community from mobilisation to intermediation (Devine 2003). From a 
western, liberal-democratic, pluralist perspective, Bangladesh certainly has a poor record on 
governance, accountability, corruption, social and political rights in which elites ‘police’ a 
limited access (see North, Wallis and Weingast 2009, Wood 2012, Wood 2014) of ordinary 
people to state mobilised resources and privileges. 
Thus, while Bangladesh is perceived as a world leader for its NGO sector involvement in 
poverty reduction programmes, the sector also attracts hostility from some elites and political 
leaders in national and local government when it moves beyond services into wider civil 
society strengthening, and especially so in sensitive MDG issues like gender, maternal rights 
as well as governance and broader rights based agendas like AOSED and SUPRO. While the 
country shows significant improvement in the Gender Equality Index, especially through the 
maternal mortality MDG, Bangladesh remains a highly patriarchal society, resulting in 
considerable gender gaps in almost all development indicators, including low levels of 
protection within their own families. 
 
Civil society activity in Bangladesh operates in a hostile political environment characterized 
by partisanship, patronage, corruption, and a winner-takes-all mentality. The major political 
parties provide an arena for elite competition via patronage distribution (Wood 2012). Civil 
society activity is not autonomous from this political culture, and the most significant civil 
society organizations (labour unions, student groups, business communities, trade unions, 
lawyers, doctors and the press) are all internally split according to their political affiliations 
(Devine 2010). This creates conflict within civil society, as well as between civil society and 
the state. Co-opted in this way, the governance potential of civil society activities is 
significantly reduced.  
 
Within civil society, NGOs are exposed to higher levels of suspicion because they have 
access to external resources, and are associated with’ international agendas’. As the NGO 
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sector has grown, questions about their transparency, accountability and effectiveness have 
intensified. The relation between government and NGOs is inherently tense. NGOs operate in 
over 80% of rural villages and are present in most urban centres. Their development activities 
directly benefit over 35% of the entire population and in some cases, the NGO sector 
overshadows government departments. For some, the fact that NGOs successfully provide core 
social services is positive and contributes to the development aims of the government.  
However others argue that reliance on NGOs encourages the creation of a ‘franchised parallel 
state’ (Wood 1997); and that contrary to popular belief, NGOs are less effective than 
government in delivering social services (Chowdhury and Mukhopadhaya 2011). A more 
nuanced analysis suggests that NGO command over resources and their membership base 
make them an easy target for partisan co-optation (Devine 2010).  
 
In this context, SPOs have to make a calculation about where on a continuum between 
philanthropic services and engineering structural and value change they wish to place 
themselves. Sexual reproductive health offers a particular challenge in this respect—see, for 
example, the SPO cases of BNWLA and DSK. 
 
While for some SPOs, this is an either/or choice, for others an engagement in service delivery 
also offers a legitimacy to participate more radically and critically in a mobilisation agenda to 
add to a stronger societal demand for good governance and the implementation of statutory 
rights, free of the rent seeking behaviour of government officials. The SPOs selected for this 
study represent a range of stances, though all: address some of the MDGs; have a need to 
strengthen their own capacities; and to varying extent engage in civil society strengthening. 
But they vary in other ways, as they face other contextual dilemmas. A key distinction exists 
between the strategies of intermediation and mobilisation. Intermediation entails a 
representation of the interests of poor, uneducated, illiterate and socially isolated clients by 
SPO personnel acting on behalf of those clients (sometimes through the creation of networks 
of intermediary CSOs) and engaged in direct service delivery. Mobilisation is based more 
upon the idea that such poor clients should have their capacities developed to represent 
themselves directly. Of course, a ‘mobilising’ NGO finds it difficult to stand back to allow 
that to happen, so that intermediation can happen by default. (Unfortunately the CIVICUS 
indicators tend to blur this important strategic distinction in the civil society strengthening 
process.) 
 
SPOs themselves are not insulated from prevailing cultural norms and organisational 
practices and thus not liberated to pursue an unambiguous de Tocquevillian agenda. They are 
embedded as other institutions (government and private) within the social imperatives arising 
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from the deep structures derived from the country’s recent agrarian past, needing to honour 
expectations and obligations from within large kin groupings and friendship networks. 
Developing a professional capacity to act independently of these norms alongside the relative 
autonomy offered by external donor funds provides some room for manoeuvre while also 
attracting criticism for bringing foreign values and funds into a domestic political process. 
They are also increasingly perceived as non-accountable domestically (just like government!), 
subject only to review by donor funders. This has prompted increasing attempts by 
government to regulate the sector, for example through the NGO Affairs Bureau (NAB), 
though it is not clear whether this option to ‘license’ the sector simply adds to rent seeking 
opportunities. A very recent development is the creation of an NGO Commission, located 
above the NAB in the government structure. This is viewed by many as opening up further 
possibilities for rent-seeking by government officials and their political leaders. More locally 
and perhaps informally, local actors take advantage of the ‘sanctioning power’ of institutions 
such as the NAB and the NGO Commission. It is therefore now more common to hear of 
reports of NGOs worried that local elite might arbitrarily submit reports to authorities, which 
have no material foundation but could have potentially irretrievable damage.  
 
The relation between NGOs and other civil society organizations also generates tension. The 
private sector sees NGOs as market rivals, progressive forces see them as subverting genuine 
grassroots activism, and conservative forces are wary of the progressive elements of NGO 
work. NGOs have been accused of ‘crowding-out’ and ignoring other civil society 
organizations. Meaningful alliances between NGOs and civil society actors are very few and 
sporadic. Furthermore NGOs compete with each other and rivalry is not uncommon. This 
weakens the scope for creating greater impact. There is therefore fluidity in state-civil society 
relations, especially in respect of externally funded NGOs. The continuing political attack 
upon the Grameen Bank (not strictly an NGO but certainly a significant civil society 
institution) is evidence of this tension. To offset this dangerous exposure, CSOs in 
Bangladesh beyond NGOs (labour unions, student groups, business communities and the 
press) are all vulnerable to political capture, and all are internally split according to their 
political affiliations between the two main competing parties (or sets of elites). Thus 
development NGOs (i.e. SPOs of MFS11) with their command over resources and 
membership base are also easy targets for partisan co-optation. This can be reinforced by the 
internal competition between NGOs, sometimes in the quest for external funding, which 
further weakens the collective efficacy of the sector to pursue MDGs and civil society 
strengthening. 
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2.8 State and Civil Society during the MFS 11 Study Period 
The precise political conditions of the 2 year study period (2012-14) represent a particular 
stage in the turbulent history of the country, with its roots in the heritage of liberation from 
Pakistan over 40 years ago. The present ruling party, Awami League, considers itself to be the 
true movement of liberation. That struggle importantly emphasised the ethnicity of Bengalis 
and secular democratic conditions in contrast to the political use of Islam to transcend the real 
nationalist divide between West and East Pakistan following the Partition of India. But the 
material conditions of liberation entailed a destroyed infrastructure, a decimated intellectual 
leadership, a famine and thus widespread poverty leading to uncontrollable anarchy in the 
countryside. The attempt to manage that situation through the formation of a de facto one-
party state (the BAKSAL coalition led by the Awami League in a form of executive 
presidential rule) in January 1975 resulted in a series of violent coups and counter coups 
between August-November 1975, before the martial law regime of General Zia Rahman 
emerged. He had been leader of the militia loyal to Bangladesh independence as part of the 
land invasion by India troops, which liberated the country from the occupying Pakistan 
forces. This potted history is necessary, because to legitimise his regime, he formed the 
Bangladesh National Party (BNP). After his assassination in May 1981, General Muhammed 
Ershad led the successor military regime, himself in turn forming the Jatiyo Party to 
legitimate his regime. Thus in the successful struggle against the Ershad regime in December 
1990, there were two main parties: Awami League and BNP. These contested the elections in 
February 1991 with a surprise victory of BNP. After a personal period in jail, Ershad and his 
party re-emerged in subsequent elections, mainly propping up the Awami League. At the end 
of the BNP government (2001-6) there was sufficient internal political chaos (violence and 
political murders between the contending parties) to prompt a military coup and a 2 year 
interim, bureaucratic ‘caretaker’ government supported by the military. The elections in 2008, 
held under interim government electoral supervision, produced a comfortable win for the 
Awami League. But towards the end of this term of office (2012), the ruling Awami League 
used its large majority in the Jatiyo Sangsad (Parliament) to pass a constitutional amendment 
abolishing the principle of 3 month interim governments neutrally supervising elections, to be 
applied to the January 2014 election. The BNP struggled against this amendment throughout 
the study period (2102-14). Powerless in the Parliament, it took its struggle again to the 
streets with hartals and blockades, resulting in both sides indulging in violence through 
bombs and murders of opposing party officials. The BNP refused to contend the January 2014 
election, resulting in a broadly uncontested overwhelming ‘victory’ for the Awami League. It 
has since justified this ‘democratic coup’ as a necessary defence against anti-nationalist, pro- 
Islamic fundamentalist, anti-secular forces, arguing that the BNP is essentially a front for 
these conservative forces, citing evidence of its previous coalitions with the Jamaat-e-Islami 
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party. As the first year of this government was ‘celebrated’ and ‘contested’ during January 
2015, resulting a resurgence of violence, widespread disruption and continuing instability, 
entailing an escalation in the use of state forces to suppress opposition, labelling it as 
‘terrorism’. 
 
It has been remarkable that progress on MDG indicators has occurred at all during this period, 
and that a policy momentum towards the eradication of extreme poverty has been sustained. 
Other economic indicators have also just remained generally positive (inflation, real wages, 
remittance flows, inward investment and so on). However the recent political eruptions, on 
top of those during 2012 and 2013, reveal the precarious condition of the society. The quote 
cited at the top of our reports attributed to the Food Minster is indicative of the situation 
facing civil society actors in general.   
 
For civil society activity, and crucially for this study, it means that any causal link between an 
SPO’s capacity (as measured by the 5 capabilities, see below) and civil society strengthening 
(as measured by the CIVICUS indicators, see below) is severed by the extreme ‘noise’ 
offered by this recent history of disruptive politics since 2012. This happens in several ways. 
First, in its nervousness about opposition threats, the ruling party in the state has significantly 
closed down space for most of civil society activity, except that sanctioned or supported by 
the ruling party. This applies to the media, to public meetings, to access to politicians and 
government officials, to donor led forums and so on. There are spies everywhere, and 
arbitrary arrests and some disappearances at the hands of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). 
Thus risks of ‘normal’ civil society mobilisation are high.  Second, NGOs in general and the 
SPOs of MFS II find it difficult to prevent their campaigning and lobbying activity from 
being perceived as taking a ‘for or against’ political position in relation to the main 
contending parties. While this may be more of an immediate problem in relation to the 
present ruling party, everyone in Bangladesh is aware that things change, coups can happen, 
open elections become possible with anti-incumbent voting. In such a multi-period game, 
taking overt positions even against the opposition may backfire, so NGOs and other parts of 
civil society shy away from overt positions at all. This drives them towards more technocratic 
performance, towards more intermediation service delivery roles, trying to stay as 
uncontroversial as possible. There is also a fear that ‘false accusations’ quickly result in SPOs 
being closed down altogether, and donors withdrawing their support. Third, under these 
conditions of mutual suspicion, civil society organisations are highly vulnerable to political 
capture. It is exceedingly difficult to steer a political neutral course. And if organisations are 
genuinely seeking to be neutral, then political parties set up their own front organisations in 
these sectors to crowd out the ones they cannot control. Student movements are the most 
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famously captured in these ways and rely heavily upon the patronage and protection of a 
parent political party. Of course, at present, only one party is calling the major shots, as it 
were. However to repeat, anyone with experience of Bangladesh sees the multi-period game. 
But the dangers of a single ruling party persistently in office, deploying the legal and extra-
legal levers of state will anyway lead to fascist conditions and oblige the co-option of all 
major civil society organisations—i.e. the realist analysis of Gramsci rather than the 
normative analysis of de Tocqueville (Wood 2014). 
 
These prevailing political and structural conditions have profound implications for the MFS II 
exercise. Put simply the scope for significant civil society strengthening as a function of 
enhanced capabilities through capacity building has been very limited over the study period 
and the prognosis is not good either. This conclusion obviously also restricts the prospect of 
attributing (through process tracing and contribution analysis) successful change to the 
variable of CFA support and Dutch government funding. In log frame terms, the right hand 
‘assumptions’ column has overwhelmed the implied causation through a theory of change 
between inputs, outputs and outcomes. 
  
Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in Bangladesh 
 
Indicators Year 
1994-95 1999-00 2004-05 2007-08 2010-11 
Real GDP growth rate (%) 4.93 5.94 5.38 6.2 6.7 
Per capita GDP (in US$) - 368 449 559 772 
Inflation (CPI-%) 8.66 2.79 6.48 9.9 8.8 
National savings as % of GDP 19.1 23.1 26.5 30.2 28.8 
Gross investment as % of GDP 19.1 23.0 24.4 24.2 25.2 
Tax revenue as % of GDP 7.9 6.8 8.7 8.8 11.9 
Export as % of GDP 9.1 12.2 14.4 17.5 20.6 
Import as % of GDP 15.4 17.8 21.9 24.5 27.1 
Remittances (billion US$) - - - 7.9 11.66 
Sectoral share of agriculture to 
GDP (%) 
26.03 25.58 21.91 20.83 20.01 
Source: Bangladesh Economic Survey (various years), Ministry of Finance, GoB. 
 
 
Table 2: Incidence of Absolute and Hardcore Poverty in Bangladesh 
Year Based on CBN method Based on DCI method 
 Upper 
poverty line 
Lower 
poverty line 
Absolute poverty  
(2,122 K. cal) 
Hardcore 
poverty  (1,805 
K. cal) 
2010 31.5 17.6 - - 
2005 40.0 25.1 40.4 19.5 
2000 48.9 34.3 44.3 20.0 
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1995-95 50.1 35.1 47.5 25.1 
1991-92 56.6 41.0 47.5 28.0 
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2005, 2010. 
 
 
Table 3: Selected Social Development Indicators in Bangladesh, 1990-2010 
Indicators Year 
1990 1995 2000 2003/05 2010/11 
 
% Underweight 
Rural - - 53.9 48.8 38.7 
Urban - - 43.1 42.2 28.0 
National 68 56.3 50.8 47.5 36.4 
 
% Stunted  
Rural - - 51.1 44.3 42.7 
Urban - - 40.4 37.6 36.2 
National 64 54.6 48.0 43 41.3 
Total Fertility Rate 4.3 3.5 3.0 2.56 2.1 
Under 5 Mortality Rate       (per 
1000) 
151 125 92 88 48 
Infant Mortality Rate                
(per 1000) 
94 71 57 53.3 31 
Maternal Mortality Rate     (per 
100,000) 
478 447 400 391 - 
Access to safe Drinking Water 89 97 97.5 97.4 97.8 
Access to Sanitary Toilet 21 38 43.4 53.2 51.5 
 
Literacy Rate (7+) 
Male 38.9 - 49.5 52.8 54.1 
Female 25.5 - 40.1 44.5 49.4 
Both 32.4 - 44.9 48.8 51.8 
Net Primary 
enrolment rate 
Boys 60 82 81 81.1 92.2 
Girls 59 82 83 84.4 97.3 
Both 60 82 82 82.8 94.8 
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate 40 49 52 53.4 61.2 
Rate of Immunization (DPT 3): 
12-23 Months 
62 69 74.4 81.0 93.2 
Severe 
Malnutrition 
(MUAC < 12.5 
cm): 12-59 months 
Boys - - 3.6 3.6 - 
Girls - - 5.7 4.8 - 
Both 11 11 4.7 4.2 - 
Net Secondary Enrolment  31.47 43.24 45.39 47.75 53.7 
Boys-Girls Ratio in Primary - 1.103 1.036 1.1098 - 
Boys-Girls Ratio in Secondary 1.23 1.096 0.866  - - 
Source: BDHS (various years), MICS (various years), BANBEIS (various years), BER 
(various year), Population Census 2011. 
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3. Key information on projects/SPOs, selection of SPOs for 
process tracing/contribution analysis 
3.1 MDG Component 
 
The aim of the MDG was to assess the contribution of MFS II funding to the achievement of 
specific MDG goals. The four SPOs involved in the MDG component study had been pre-
selected and research questions had been pre-defined by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MoFA). Although the SPOs in the study aim for results on more than one MDG, as 
part of the pre-selection process one MDG theme was randomly selected as the main focus 
for the evaluation. A baseline survey was carried out on all the SPOs in 2012 and two years 
later a follow up assessment was carried out. Further details of the methodology and analysis 
for the MDG component are provided in section 4 below.  
 
Bangladesh has a population of about 160 million with an area of only 144,000 square 
kilometers which makes the country the most densely populated country in the world barring 
a few small city states like Singapore. However, the Bangladesh economy has experienced 
both macroeconomic stability and modest economic growth following its transition to a 
democratic process in the early 1990s. The Bangladesh economy has registered an average 
GDP growth of around 6 per cent in recent years.   
 
As stated above in section 2, the incidence of poverty (including moderate and 
extreme/hardcore poverty) has declined in Bangladesh over the past several years: income 
poverty has declined from 56.6 percent in 1991-92 to 40.0 percent in 2005 and 31.5 percent in 
2010. Similarly, extreme poverty has also declined substantially during the same period. 
However, nearly one-third of the population still lives below the national poverty line. With 
such a high incidence of poverty, the government as well as the non-government 
organizations and development partners are active in implementing various anti-poverty and 
social programs to help the poor and the poorest in the country. This progress has been 
supported by significant progress across a range of MDG indicators (see section 2 above).  
 
In this circumstances, several poverty reducing, livelihoods improvement, human and social 
development and social mobilization type interventions have also been/are being 
implemented in Bangladesh with support from Dutch Government. The present evaluation is, 
therefore, designed to assess the impact of MFS II funded projects on MDG outcomes in 
Bangladesh.     
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A total of four projects were pre-selected for evaluation under the MDG sub-component. The 
names of the projects and partners and reference to MDGs are presented in the following 
matrix. A brief description of project specific contexts is also presented below. 
 
Table 4: Projects and Partners 
Projects Partners Consortium  Total 
Budget 
Of which 
MFS11 % 
MDGs/Themes 
A2. Sustainable 
Livelihoods of the 
Poor Women 
Unnayan 
Shahojogy Team 
(UST) 
ICCO Alliance  E105000 
100% 
1 (eradicate 
extreme poverty 
and hunger) 
A3. Rural 
Development 
Programme 
Nijera Kori ICCO Alliance E2,711,870 
11% 
1 (eradicate 
extreme poverty 
and hunger) 
A1. Girl Power 
Programme 
Bangladesh 
National Women 
Lawyers’ 
Association 
(BNWLA) 
Child Rights 
Alliance 
E233,679 
90% 
3 (promote 
gender equality 
and empower 
women) 
A4. Unite for Body 
Rights – CHC 
Project 
Christian Hospital 
Chandraghona 
(CHC) 
SRHR 
Alliance 
E950,000 
52.6% 
4, 5 and 6 (4: 
reduce child 
mortality; 5: 
improve 
maternal health; 
6: combat 
HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and 
other diseases) 
 
Project A2: Achieving Sustainable Livelihoods of the Poor Women  
The project started in October 2009 and was completed in May 2012. It was an independent 
project and not a follow-up or continuation of another project. The project was implemented 
by Unnayan Shahojogy Team (UST), a SPO which works mainly in rural, vulnerable areas in 
Bangladesh. The main objective of the project was to i) assist people to create opportunities to 
be involved in sustainable income earning activities through mobilizing local resources; ii) 
provide support for vulnerable people, making them aware of the adverse impacts of climate 
change and preparing them to adapt well to changing circumstances; iii) organize more poor 
people of the working area as samities (groups) in order to provide them with development 
education and to facilitate the delivery of social and economic services so that they can build 
more resilient and sustainable livelihoods.  
 
The project had 13,558 beneficiaries. Most of them were poor and extreme poor women in 
five villages of one upazila (sub-district) of Barguna district. The project entailed an initial 
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assessment to identify the poor/extreme poor in the respective villages. Then female members 
of the identified households were initially selected as potential members for the project. Then 
the formation of the groups (samities) was made one after another until the intended numbers 
of beneficiaries had been allocated to a group.  Other project outputs included savings 
mobilization, training, capital support, seeds and plants distribution, production activities, and 
building liaisons with government and other agencies. The total project budget was EURO 
105,000 which was fully funded by MFS II. 
 
UST believes in people’s power and also believes that it is people themselves who must find a 
way of achieving sustainable development. Following this perspective, UST tries to use the 
strength of local people by mobilizing them into groups and providing them support so that 
they themselves can get involved in various activities to achieve sustainable development. 
 
The activities carried out under the project were aimed at improving the capacity of 
beneficiaries to carry out various production activities, enabling knowledge transfers on 
various social issues and early warning system and rescue and evacuation, establishing 
linkages with other agencies to achieve improved livelihoods and food security for 
beneficiaries. 
 
The project managed to implement all the activities as planned. Although the project is 
located in one of the most disaster-prone areas of the country, no major local hazards 
occurred during the two years of the project.  
 
Project A3: Rural Development Program – Ensuring democracy, accountability and 
rights  
The project started in September 2010 and was completed in March 2013. This was the 
continuation of an earlier project of the southern partner. In fact, this is the core programme 
of the SPO (Nijera Kori) and as such has been implemented since the partner started activities 
in the locality, i.e. 1980. The project was initiated by the SPO, which works mainly among 
the poor people in rural communities in Bangladesh. The main objectives of the project were 
i) to unite people, both women and men who have long been victims of exploitation, social 
marginalization, oppression and poverty; ii) to enable people thus united to understand and 
develop awareness about their rights, causes of problems, and responsibilities; and iii) to 
empower people to take up challenges on their own to create better and more meaningful 
lives for themselves and their immediate community.  
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Landless and the marginal farmers, sharecroppers, day labourers, indigenous people, and 
fisher folk were the beneficiaries of the project. This project had 232,283 group members in 
1,363 villages from 37 upazilas (sub-districts) located in 17 of a total of 64 districts in the 
country. An initial assessment was carried out to identify who could be the potential 
members/beneficiaries of the project. Those identified were then motivated to form groups of 
16-30 members each. Most of the potential members of the villages were included in groups. 
The groups come together then as a village committee.   
 
Project inputs included mobilizing beneficiaries into groups; assisting them to form village, 
union and upazila level committees; giving inputs including training so that beneficiaries 
could lead and manage the groups and the committees; providing support and training to help 
develop autonomous landless organizations; helping landless groups gain access to khas 
lands5 including dealing with land registrations and providing legal aid; identifying suitable 
income earning activities and helping beneficiaries take advantage of these by providing 
training, support funds and so forth. 
 
The activities carried out under the project helped beneficiaries have better access to land and 
other collective community resources, and capacity to manage those resources. The important 
point to note here is that the evaluation of this project enabled us to assess the impact of social 
mobilization on MDG outcomes. The total project budget was EURO 2,711,870, of which 
11% was provided by MFS II.  
 
The project implemented all the activities as planned. The major challenge of the project, 
however, was the displacement of beneficiaries through both a rise in rural-urban labour 
migration as well as the eviction of poor people from marginal land. 
 
Project A1: Girl Power Project  
The project started in January 2011 and is expected to continue until December 2015. This is 
an independent project and was initiated through the support offered by MFS II. The main 
objectives of the project are to i) increase capacity of right holders (girls and young women) 
to protect themselves from gender-based violence; ii) strengthen civil society organizations in 
policy lobbying and advocacy to establish rights and justice for girls and young women; and 
iii) improve legal protection system for girls and young women.  
 
                                                     
5 Khas land is government owned land which is usually distributed among selected beneficiary groups 
including the poor 
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Girls and young women aged 10-24 years are the beneficiaries of the project. The project 
targets 6,500 girls and young women aged 10-24 years as beneficiaries, and is implemented in 
different slums in 5 zones of Dhaka city. The implementing organization (Bangladesh 
National Women Lawyers’ Association - BNWLA) initially identified communities, which 
are more vulnerable and disadvantaged. Then a list of intended beneficiaries (around 25 for 
each group) was prepared with the support of local CSOs who have long been working with 
the respective communities.        
 
The activities carried out under the project included identifying vulnerable locations and 
within these the most vulnerable girls and young women; providing support to the girls and 
young women so that they can organize their own groups; conducting orientation sessions for 
girls and young women on child rights, child protection and communication; conducting life 
skills training (e.g. karate); producing research reports on livelihood linkages and support 
requirements; providing livelihood training, and support for self-employment; conducting 
mass awareness campaigns at community levels on issues of violence, child marriage and 
child protection; establishing and servicing girls and young women forums and facilitating 
their meetings; and organizing annual conventions. 
 
The activities are implemented in a range of communities and the lead implementing 
organization (Bangladesh National Women Lawyers’ Association - BNWLA) collaborates 
with local CSOs to identify and support girls and young women. The total budget for the 
project is EURO 233,679, of which 90% is provided by MFS II  
 
So far, the project has implemented all its planned activities. The major challenges of the 
project, however, are that beneficiary girls and young women live in fragile communities. As 
such they are constantly exposed to various dangers and the task of retaining them in the 
forum/network is a challenge. Once a young women/girl leaves the forum/network, it is often 
quite difficult to find them again. 
 
The implementation of the project activities is directly monitored by the Dutch SPOs through 
its representative office in Bangladesh (Plan Bangladesh). Quarterly reports are produced and 
delivered. Regular meetings are also organized to discuss progress and any problems. Visits 
to the beneficiaries’ communities are also made.  
 
 
 
 
 33 
Project A4: Unite for Body Rights – Christian Hospital Chandraghona (CHC) Project  
 
The project started in January 2011 and is expected to be completed in December 2015. Like 
the previous one, it is an independent project and was initiated with the support of MFS II. 
The main objectives of the project are: i) to increase utilization of comprehensive SRHR 
services; and ii) to increase delivery of comprehensive sexuality education. 
 
Young (aged 10-24 years) and poor people from 14,000 households who lack and/or cannot 
access SRH education and services are the beneficiaries of the project. The project is 
implemented in the Kaptai upazila of Rangamati district. The recipients of SRH services are 
mainly those who come to Christian Hospital Chandraghona (CHC) for services. Community 
people, especially the youth and adolescents, are also advised to contact the UBR 
representatives at the CHC for any advice/support related to SRH. For Comprehensive 
Sexuality Education (CSE), a group of 10 boys and 10 girls (20 in total) have been chosen 
from grades seven to nine from each of the educational institutes of the sub-district. These are 
meant to disseminate knowledge to other youths through peer education system. Teachers of 
the same educational institutes and the respective community leader have also been chosen 
for orientation workshops.        
 
The implementing organization of the project, the Christian Hospital Chandraghona (CHC), is 
more than one hundred years old, and has been delivering reproductive and other health 
services to the people living in Kaptai and adjacent areas. Under the UBR project, CHC has 
set up a new office in the hospital with a dedicated team of health professionals and 
administrative staff. The activities that are being carried out by CHC under the project 
include: 
 Provide an ante-natal, post-natal and delivery care to an increasing number of 
patients, particularly to those who are below 25 years of age; 
 Provide services related to SRH (e.g., MR, D&C, SRH related surgeries, 
contraceptive support, etc.) to an increasing number of patients below the age of 25; 
 Provide training and support to young counselors; and 
 Form groups of boys and girls aged 10-24 years from different educational 
institutions of the sub-district, and provide training for Comprehensive Sexuality 
Education (CSE). 
     
The project has so far implemented all its planned activities. However, the issues that the 
project is dealing with are sensitive given the socio-cultural context of the country. Even 
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though CHC has been working at the community level for many years. However it has not 
traditionally focused on sexual health and rights, especially amongst the youth and 
adolescents. It is therefore important that the project activities, especially the CSE component 
are implemented carefully because of its sensitive nature. The implementing organization 
seems to have achieved this successful. The hospital is very well regarded locally. 
 
The implementation of project activities is monitored directly by the Dutch SPO through its 
representative in Bangladesh. Periodic reports are produced and delivered. Regular meetings 
are also organized to discuss progress and potential problems. Occasional visits to the 
respective communities are also made. The total budget of the project is EURO 950,000 of 
which 52.6% is funded by MFS II.  
 
3.2 Capacity Development Component 
 
The aim of the Capacity Development component was to assess the contribution of MFS II 
funding to capacity building in five SPOs. The SPOs had been pre-selected and research 
questions had been pre-defined by MoFA. A baseline survey was carried out on all the SPOs 
in 2012 and two years later, a follow up assessment was carried out. 
 
The capacity development component adopted an organisational assessment tool to evaluate 
five key capabilities: i) to adapt and self-renew; ii) to act and commit; iii) to deliver on 
development objectives; iv) to relate to external stakeholders; v) to achieve coherence. 
Workshops were carried out with SPO staff to identify specific indicators against each of 
these capabilities. Progress over the two year period was then assessed using these indicators.  
Other components of the evaluation included an organisational timeline, an impact grid and 
alternative explanation testing. Details are provided in section 4 below.  
A total of five projects were pre-selected for evaluation under the CD sub-component. The 
names of the projects and partners are presented in the following matrix. A brief description 
of the partner NGO and specific contexts is also presented below. 
 
Table 5: Projects and Partners 
Projects Partners Consortium CFA 
Organisational Capacity 
Development  
Centre for Disability in 
Development (CDD)* 
ICCO Alliance  Light for the 
World 
Organisational Capacity 
Development 
An Organisation for 
Social-Economic 
Development (AOSED)* 
WASH Alliance SIMAVI 
Organisational Capacity Practical Action WASH Alliance WASTE 
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Development Bangladesh (PAB) 
Organisational Capacity 
Development 
Sushasoner Jonny 
Procharavizan 
(SUPRO)* 
Impact Alliance Oxfam Novib 
Organisational Capacity 
Development 
Village Education Centre 
(VERC) 
Communities 
Change Alliance 
Cordaid 
* Shared with Civil Society Strengthening Component 
 
Centre for Disability in Development (CDD) 
The Capacity Development project started in 2011 and will continue into 2015. CDD is 
supported by Light for the World through Prism a member of the ICCO Alliance. Light for 
the World (LFTW) funding is aimed at strengthening the capacity of CDD and local partners 
towards mainstreaming disability. The cooperation started in 2003 and the end date is 
undefined as they are hoping to move to a strategic partnership after the 2015 funding has 
ended. The main concentration of support during this project period has been to help prepare 
funding proposals to broaden CDD funding base and provide a consultant to facilitate the 
process of developing a theory of change and a strategic master plan. These were still in the 
process of being finalised at the time of the evaluation. 
 
An Organisation for Social Economic Development (AOSED)  
AOSED was supported by Simavi (Dutch Wash Alliance) form January 2011 till the end of 
2013. Following a mid-term review and discussions between Simavi and AOSED, a decision 
was taken not to continue with funding. There are contrasting and contentious views on the 
decision to discontinue funding (see relevant sections in the technical paper). AOSED is 
engaged primarily in water programmes in South Western Bangladesh based in Khulna. The 
group was founded in 1999/2000 with an emphasis on natural resources tied to concerns over 
livelihoods, climate change and focused on water related issues compounded by being in an 
area with coastal, delta, agricultural and drinking water challenges. AOSED has been 
relatively successful in supporting a participatory approach to water rights in many 
communities in the region. The SPO argues that water is a right, not just a commodity, which 
needs to be managed in the public interest (which does not assume that there are not costs to 
be met in doing so). In the baseline exercise in 2012, AOSED was optimistic and 
organisationally it was looking towards a positive future by planning an expansion in its work 
as well as organisational improvements. On our visits in 2014, we encountered several major 
problems linked to the decision not to continue funding. This decision had a very negative 
impact on AOSED because the MFS II support was its only major source of funding. 
Although at the time of our evaluation a VSO volunteer arrived funded by Simavi it was not 
possible to assess her contribution to capacity development.  
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Practical Action Bangladesh  
The Capacity Development Project led by the Dutch WASH Alliance funding to Practical 
Action Bangladesh is through a Dutch NGO – WASTE the total amount of funds in relation 
to Practical Action Bangladesh overall budget is 3%. The cooperation between the two 
organisations began in 2005 is expected to end in 2015. However they are working on 
developing other programmes and projects and are expecting a longer-term relationship. The 
MFS II project period funded a continuous process of Capacity Development support since 
2005. In November 2012, the Wash Alliance supported a joint  process of developing a 
Theory of Change for the Bangladesh Wash Alliance of which all members of the Urban and 
Rural Wash Alliances participated (the contract was managed by ICCO). Simavi and the 
Wash Alliance Country Coordinator attended the activities to encourage participation. Other 
capacity development inputs have been provided to the Bangladesh Wash Alliance and some 
specific capacity development inputs were designed for Practical Action Bangladesh during 
the project period. 
 
Sushasoner Jonny Procharavizan (SUPRO) 
 SUPRO is an organisation with some 600 organisational members throughout Bangladesh. 
SUPRO is in essence a capacity building organisation which aims to improve the lobbying 
and campaigning work of its members. Oxfam/Novib has supported SUPRO, since 2006 and 
plans to continue at least until the end of the current MFS II. Oxfam/Novib has also 
introduced SUPRO to an international network working on taxation issues. The major 
weakness of SUPRO is that it is financially overly dependent on Oxfam/Novib. SUPRO’s aim 
is to both develop a stronger civil society voice as well as build on certain campaigns 
common to all the members. In some ways it explicitly aims to both strengthen civil society 
and build the capacity of various levels within Bangladeshi society, from its own members 
(mainly local NGOs), the grass roots groups with which their members work and local 
government officials both elected and unelected. As can be seen from our review SUPRO can 
indeed claim several areas of success for example in its fair taxation and other programmes. 
This has been achieved through the legitimacy of its widespread membership, which has 
strengthened it relationships with government and other stakeholders locally. The 
Oxfam/Novib contribution to SUPRO has been crucial to its success. 
 
Village Education Centre (VERC) 
VERC is one of the oldest groups in Bangladesh founded in 1977. VERC took its capacity 
development work directly into villages working with the rural poor, starting with women’s 
literacy, children’s creativity programmes, health, sanitation and human development. 
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VERC’s strength lies in its training services, with a commitment to quality materials and 
trainers. To date, they claim to have provided training to 100,000 people. VERC is well 
regarded throughout Bangladesh; it has led the development of many now accepted 
approaches to non-formal education, water and sanitation. It has increasingly realised that it 
needs to work with government not ignore them as perhaps happened in the past. The 
relationship with Cordaid goes back many years and is seen to have been productive for 
VERC, although it has to be said that this is because of many years of engagement not 
specifically anything which may have happened in the last couple of years. Thus the concept 
of MFS II to look at capacity development within this time period misses the point for such a 
large well-established agency with long term relationships and partnerships. Some of the 
major changes in VERC’s approach are, they claim, the result of Cordaid’s funding and ideas, 
but often these happened more than 10 years ago when the funding was a far greater 
proportion of VERC’s income; currently accounting for less the 3%.  
 
3.3 Civil Society Strengthening Component 
 
Unlike the other two components, the Strengthening Civil Society component did not have 
pre-selected SPOs but did have pre-selected questions, defined by MoFA. We selected 16 
SPOs to carry out a baseline (2012) and follow-up assessment (2014). The main criteria used 
to select the 16 SPOs were i) MDG focus; ii) size and geographical representation; iii) CFA 
partnership representation. To facilitate the baseline and follow-up assessment, we adopted 
the CIVICUS methodology and in between these two points, we incorporated a contribution 
analysis of five detailed case studies. See section 4 below for further details on the 
methodology.  
 
Three of the selected SPOs were also involved in the capacity development component 
(AOSED, SUPRO and CDD). Overviews of each of these organisations are provided in the 
previous section. In these cases, we looked to see if and how performance in one component 
might impact on another component.  
 
Table 6: Selected SPOs for Strengthening Civil Society (SCS) component:  
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change 
ASK Impact   X    X 
AOSED  WASH alliance     X X  
Aparajeyo Childs right alliance  X X    X 
ACD Childs right alliance        
BNN  Press Freedom  X X    X 
BWLA Childs right alliance       X 
Caritas Communities of 
change 
X X  X X   
CDD ICCO alliance    X   X 
CSS Woord in DAAD X X  X   X 
DSK  SRHR Alliance    X  X  
FPAB SRHR Alliance   X X  X  
PAB WASH alliance X       
SUPRO Impact  X     X 
Uttaran WASH alliance     X X  
VARD Communities of 
change 
   X X   
* MDG 7 a, b: Sustainable living environment and biodiversity 
**MDG 7c: Drinking water and sanitation 
 
Both ACD and Aparajeyo (the two remaining SPO case studies not overlapping with the 
capacity development component) are implementers of the same Girl Power Project (GPP), a 
five-year (2011-2015) project funded by Plan International Bangladesh. The overall aim of 
the project is to promote equal rights and opportunities for girls and young women and 
eradicate gender-based violence. There are four main areas of engagement: 
 
1. Civil society level. Main activities include forming and strengthening CSOs around 
issues related to violence against young women and girls including training on child 
protection and advocacy around gender violence; 
2. Institutional level. Main activities here include promoting greater awareness and 
building capacity of government officials around gender equality, especially for 
young women and goals 
3. Socio-cultural level. Activities here include forming local groups capable of 
protecting children and ensuring gender equality and protection  
4. Individual level. Activities here include training and skills formation of girls and 
young women, creation the “Girls Forums”, child protection committees, karate 
classes, birth registration amongst other things.  
 
Through ACD, the Girl Power Project is implemented in 5 Upazilas within Rajshahi District 
(north west of Bangladesh), and targets over 6,000 girls and young women between the ages 
of 10 and 24; 25 CSOs; 120 duty bearers and 100 CBOs. Since Rajshahi is flanking the Indian 
 39 
border, ACD also implements activities to stop child trafficking. The total value of the grant 
is 21,279,024 Taka (approximately 240,000 euros), which constitutes the largest grant held by 
ACD.  
 
Through Aparajeyo Bangladesh, the Girl Power Project is implemented in urban settings in 
five of the Southern wards of Dhaka city. The project has 6,250 direct beneficiaries (girls and 
young women). Aparajeyo provides and delivers services directly to the beneficiaries 
themselves with no intermediary institution. The contribution of GPP in Aparajeyo 
Bangladesh’s total budget is 4.46%. 
 
 
4. General evaluation approach and key indicators (methodology)  
 
The study seeks to evaluate the contribution of the MFS II round of Dutch government 
funding via CFAs to Southern Partner Organisations (SPOs) in Bangladesh over the period 
2012-2014. The evaluation comprises 3 components: 
 
 the achievement of selected Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) via SPOs; 
 the contribution of both funding and CFA support to the organisational capacity of 
SPOs to engage in both service delivery (i.e. towards MDGs via intermediation) and 
in forms of social mobilisation to strengthen the place of civil society in the overall 
development of the society; 
 the outcomes of SPO activity in terms of indicators about strengthening civil society 
which might be traced back to MFS II support. 
 
The study proceeded through a baseline exercise in 2012, followed by an endline study in late 
2014. The quantitative data were collected for comparison at 2 fixed points (late 2012 and late 
2014). Between these two points, additional intensive case studies were carried out, using a 
combination of quantitative indicators, qualitative descriptions and observations for 
contribution analysis.  
 
For the MDG study, 4 SPOs were pre-selected as part of the initial contract for this study, 
reflecting different MDGs, scale of operation and proportions of budget supported by MFS11 
(see below MDG summary for more details on these variables and methodology, calibrated to 
each SPO project). 
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Before-after and project-control comparisons through difference-in-differences methods (by 
initially taking double differences in means or proportions and then by undertaking difference 
in difference regressions for some selected indicators for validation of the results obtained) 
were used here to assess the impacts of the projects. In addition, group discussions and 
individual interviews were also carried out to understand the underlying causes. The study 
drew sample households/respondents from both the project beneficiaries and the 
control/comparison groups. This enabled us to make comparisons of outcomes before and 
after the implementation of the project, and between beneficiaries and control/comparison 
households over the same period.  
 
Where data are available for both ‘before’ and ‘after’ the implementation of the project and 
also for both the ‘project’ and ‘control’ respondents, the difference-in-difference method itself 
is expected to produce robust results. These conditions were met in all four cases. Although 
we considered including ‘matching methods’, these would not have improved the robustness 
and comprehensiveness of ‘difference in difference’. We carried out difference-in-difference 
analyses by initially taking double differences in means or proportions as applicable (see 
Table 9 through to Table 13) and then by carrying out difference-in-difference regressions for 
some of the indicators to validate the results. The regressions are reported in Appendix 1, 
Table 5.1 to Table 5.5 of the Technical Report). Furthermore, we triangulated difference in 
difference findings with key stakeholders through qualitative interviews. 
 
 
For projects A2 and A3, the implementing SPOs used certain inclusion criteria to select 
beneficiaries. Although beneficiaries are reported as individuals (i.e. poor women in project 
A2 and poor and landless in project A3), in project terms activities are often aimed at 
household units and not only individuals. Thus for example income generating activities are 
usually arranged at a household level not an individual one. In order to carry out our analysis, 
we sampled households with beneficiary members. As such for most of our data, the basic 
unit of analysis is the household. In some questions, we have disaggregated to reach 
individual level analysis (e.g. schooling, training etc.). In selecting the sample households 
from the two projects, we adopted the same criteria used by the SPO. In this way our sample 
is a robust representative of project beneficiaries. In the first stage therefore, a census was 
carried out in the respective villages to collect household information based on some key 
household and individual indicators. Then a list of eligible households was prepared and this 
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was used to randomly sample households for the study.6 The same technique was applied for 
both the beneficiary and the control/comparison groups for both projects (A2 and A3).  
 
For A1 and A4, the sample of beneficiaries was chosen randomly from among the project 
beneficiaries. The selection of control/comparison groups was not as easy as the previous two 
projects. However we made every effort to identify control/comparison groups for both 
projects using the same criteria that were used by the SPOs to select their target beneficiary 
groups. The basic feature of the beneficiaries and the control/comparison groups was that they 
both live in similar geo-physical, political and cultural settings and are from similar 
socioeconomic locations. 
 
For two projects (A2 and A1), the control/comparison groups were chosen from the same 
villages/communities and for the remaining two projects (A3 and A4), the control/comparison 
groups were selected from neighbouring villages/communities. The nature of A3 and A4 
means that contamination (i.e. spill over of benefits) could easily occur since there are 
elements of community focused approach of the intervention. In these cases, we deliberately 
sought control groups from nearby but not the same villages. The selection of the 
households/respondents was made in line with the way (using the same criteria) beneficiaries 
were selected.  
 
The table below presents the size of the sample of both beneficiary and the 
control/comparison groups for each of the projects. 
 
Table 7: Sample size beneficiary and control groups for each project 
Projects Sample size: 
Beneficiary 
Sample size: 
Control/ comparison 
A2. Sustainable Livelihoods of the Poor 
Women 
150 100 
A3. Rural Development Program 200 100 
A1. Girl Power Program 200 100 
A4. Unite for Body Rights – CHC Project 150 100 
Total 700 400 
 
Four sets of questionnaires were developed to collect information. The first set of 
questionnaires was used for Projects A2 and A3 to collect information from respondent 
households. The second set of questionnaires was used for Project A1 to collect information 
from respondent girls and young women. The third and fourth sets of questionnaires were 
                                                     
6 Our reporting of data therefore focuses on sampled households. Where the data refers to individuals 
as opposed to households, we make this clear.  
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used for Project A4 to collect information from both the respondent households and 
adolescent boys and girls. The questionnaires included variables related to demographic, 
socio-economic, gender relation, women empowerment, sexual and reproductive health, and 
relevant other issues.  Further information on MDG methodology can be found in the 
Technical Report, Appendix 2.   
 
For the capacity development study, 5 SPOs were pre-selected for intensive case study 
treatment as part of the initial contract for the study. In conformity with the whole MFS 11 
cross country study, 5 organisational capabilities were each scored on a 5 point scale at two 
fixed points in 2012 and 2014. Workshops were carried out with SPO staff to identify specific 
indicators against each of these capabilities. During workshops, the team also worked with 
the SPOs to produce timelines and impact grids. The former helped identify key milestones 
and donors, which then provided evidence of organisational change.  
 
On top of this, in the follow-up assessment, the team introduced an impact grid exercise to 
help identify key impact narratives (positive and negative). The key impact narratives were 
then followed up through field visits, interviews and so forth in order to assess the 
significance and weight of the impact and evaluate the contribution of MFS II funding and 
support. Follow up on the impact grids aimed to test therefore alternative explanations of 
change.   
 
Holistic organisational assessment tools are most useful for organisations seeking to self-
assess their capabilities. However when using them to draw plausible linkages between an 
external agencies’ output work (i.e. capacity building) and resulting internal (SPO level) 
outcome change (i.e. capacity development) there are potential flaws. This is particularly the 
case where the external agency does not have significant influence over the local organisation 
in all its areas (as was the case with some of the SPOs pre-selected for this component). Thus 
the tool may show significant changes but these may not be traceable to the external agency. 
Contribution analysis does not really overcome this flaw with the reduction of information to 
two over simple ratings: capability and contributions. Within each capability, the spectrum of 
activity can be wide with gains and losses attributable to different variables of which the 
external agency is only one. There is also the inherent problem of positive bias in self-
reporting, especially in Bangladesh where auto critiques simply provide openings for enemies 
(see context section above). 
 
There has also been a problem of inherent perverse selection. The choice of SPOs to examine 
(note these were pre-selected) in relation to MFS 11 was oriented more towards those with 
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significance: larger, more likely impact (especially on MDGs), and with longer established 
profiles and reputation. Thus they already had capacity, and indeed more capacity than their 
supporting CFAs to engage with the complex political and socio-economic context of 
Bangladesh where transparency of process and set up has to give way to deep structures 
replete with patronage and personalised loyalties. This is a subtle cultural environment in 
which crude, measures of organisational capacity can be seriously misplaced. Dutch CFAs 
seek to operate in a liberal-democratic pluralist political framework and ‘capacities’ are 
derived from that premise. These are not the qualifications which lead to sustainability of 
primary purposes and organisational existence in Bangladesh. In other words, the notion of 
‘capacity’ in the five capability model developed by ECDPM do not engage with the 
capacities needed for survival and effectiveness in the patron-client, mastaanised context of 
Bangladesh where even the regulatory authority, the NGO Affairs Bureau, expects to receive 
rent to permit an SPO to exist and function (see context section above). 
 
Finally the core methodological problem in relation to process tracing is the misplaced 
syllogism between capacity enhancement of a SPO and any changes on that SPO’s immediate 
environment/community. Process tracing is best applied when there is a reasonably sure case 
for believing that a change has happened. Thus it may be valid to identify a change in 
capacity and then seek to investigate contributory factors. It may be equally valid to identify 
changes at community level and seek to investigate what role (if any) was played by the SPO. 
But to put these results together may be stretching the evidence too far. In such cases we 
would be looking to assess a change at community level, identify the contribution not just of 
the SPO but of changes in the SPO’s relations with the community, and then go further back 
to establish the contribution of the Dutch agency to those changes in relations. In our opinion, 
successive leaps of this kind introduce too much margin for error, and making decisions 
based on these findings would be fraught with difficulties.  
 
In other words, process tracing may be a valid methodology for assessing the contribution of 
the SPO to an observed change. It may also be a valid methodology for assessing the 
contribution of an external agency to capacity change within a supported organisation. But if 
you try and put the two together you may end up with a case where the potential margin for 
error is far higher than the degree of change witnessed. Further information on capacity 
Development methodology can be found in the Technical Report, Appendix 3.   
 
For the civil society strengthening component, in conformity with the whole MFS II cross 
country study, 5 CIVICUS aggregate indicators were scored at two fixed points in 2012 and 
2014 for a sample of 16 SPOs drawn from a total SPO population of 60 to represent size, 
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significance, MDG sector, geographical spread and CFA range. Within each of these 5 
aggregate CIVICUS indicators, there were up to 6 sub-indicators to contribute to the 
aggregate indicator score. The scores in 2012 and 2014 reflected a combination of 
‘judgements’ based upon qualitative interviews and dialogue by a trained team of 
interviewers supervised by the academic leaders from Bath, their own standardising 
judgments, self-reporting, and triangulation with other stakeholders. In addition to this 16 
SPO Q-squared exercise, 5 of the 16 SPOs were selected (again reflecting sector and 
significance) for intensive case study process tracing for contribution analysis, conducted by 
the academic supervisors from Bath.  
 
The CIVICUS exercise provided snapshots of performance at specific points. We wanted to 
look more at process and understand how impact was achieved (or not) and also test the 
claimed impact contributions of SPOs. To do this, we identified 5 SPOs in the follow up 
study to carry out more detailed and in-depth case studies. This entailed a focused field trips 
and interviews with various stakeholders. In carrying out the case studies, we also developed 
a systematic contribution analysis, which enabled us to test SPO contributions to 
strengthening civil society.  
 
Like process tracing, contribution analysis is a theory based impact evaluation which explores 
attribution (cause-effect) questions through a logical argumentation in order to assess the 
contributions a policy/programme makes to observed changes in outcomes. Contribution 
analysis does not prove causality but seeks to reduce uncertainty about the difference a 
programme may or may not be making.  This approach follows 6 key steps: a) establish a 
cause-effect issue; b) develop a postulated theory of change in relation to the cause-effect; c) 
gather evidence on the theory of change; d) construct a contribution story or narrative, and 
challenges to it; e) seek additional evidence; f) revise/confirm contribution narrative. 
 
As indicated above, we selected 5 SPOs for contribution analysis. Typically this involved 
field visits of 3-4 days by the research team and subsequent iterations with the evolving 
contribution. During this time, we also conducted the CIVICUS questionnaire. As will be 
seen in the technical reports, the contribution analysis exposed the research team to a more 
complex policy environment in which it was observed the coexistence of multiple 
interventions targeting the beneficiaries of CFA supported SPO interventions; multiple 
partners and stakeholders contributing to the observed changes associated with the SPO 
intervention; a dynamic and fast moving environment which impacted the ability of different 
actors to implement activities and the feasibility of these actions resulting in change. In short, 
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contribution analysis forced the research team to deal with greater complexity in assessing 
change and the contribution of SPO interventions.  
 
As indicated in our baseline and again above, the contribution analysis represented our 
attempt to incorporate ‘thick case studies’ into our analysis in order to complement the 
‘thinner cases’ provided by CIVICUS analysis. With this aim in mind, the contribution 
analysis proved successful and enabled us to go beyond some of the inevitable limitations of 
the CIVICUS approach.  
 
5. Summary of results and analysis (by component)  
5.1 MDGs  
Below we provide a summary of projects, partners, consortium membership, budget size and 
MDG focus. These have all explained in detail in relevant sections above.  
 
Table 8: Projects and Partners 
Projects Partners Consortium  Total 
Budget 
Of which 
MFS11 % 
MDGs/Themes 
A2. Sustainable 
Livelihoods of the 
Poor Women 
Unnayan 
Shahojogy Team 
(UST) 
ICCO Alliance  E105000 
100% 
1 (eradicate 
extreme poverty 
and hunger) 
A3. Rural 
Development 
Programme 
Nijera Kori ICCO Alliance E2,711,870 
11% 
1 (eradicate 
extreme poverty 
and hunger) 
A1. Girl Power 
Programme 
Bangladesh 
National Women 
Lawyers’ 
Association 
(BNWLA) 
Child Rights 
Alliance 
E233,679 
90% 
3 (promote 
gender equality 
and empower 
women) 
A4. Unite for Body 
Rights – CHC 
Project 
Christian Hospital 
Chandraghona 
(CHC) 
SRHR 
Alliance 
E950,000 
52.6% 
4, 5 and 6 (4: 
reduce child 
mortality; 5: 
improve 
maternal health; 
6: combat 
HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and 
other diseases) 
 
5.2 Key Findings (Major Impact) 
 
In order to understand the results, it is important to reiterate that:  
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1. the evaluation period covers the 2012-2014 period. All the selected MDG projects 
have however been or are being implemented over a longer time period;  
2. the baseline survey was carried out after all the projects had been started. Indeed 
the baseline was carried out after one project (A2) had been completed. Our 
baseline therefore may not be an accurate reflection of the beneficiary baseline. 
This is evidenced above in inter alia Table 3 and discussed in footnote 5 of the 
Technical Report; 
3. the end-line survey was completed before two projects (A1 and A4) had been 
completed;  
4. two of the four projects (A1 and A4) are ‘new’ or ‘innovative’ in Bangladesh and are 
‘culturally sensitive’; 
5. although both A1 and A4 were pre-selected to assess impact on selected MDG 
outcomes, we have considered a wider range of socio-economic and rights, 
awareness and empowerment related indicators precisely because the projects are 
innovative and culturally sensitive.  
 
In summary, the results obtained through our evaluation have to be read with the above points 
in mind. Moreover the results should be read and interpreted in conjunction with results 
obtained for other indicators indicated in (5) above. Our overall observations on findings are: 
 
(a) not all indicators demonstrate significant improvement over the period under 
consideration;  
(b) however there have been some significant improvements in some indicators and these are 
also attributable to project interventions. This would indicate that although our assessment 
period is short (two years) there is good evidence that project outcomes are moving in the 
‘right’ direction; 
(c) our data largely shows consistent results between different related indicators. Thus for 
example where we see improvements in the percentage of people moving out of extreme 
poverty or always in deficit category, we also see a ‘deterioration’ in the percentage of people 
in moderate poverty or occasional deficit category. This simply indicates improvement or 
mobility at the lowest end but not much beyond this level;  
(d) results are also consistent with what the projects expected in terms of results.  
 
In order to see whether and to what extent the achievements are due to project interventions, a 
difference-in-difference method has been applied in the four projects under consideration. 
The difference in difference takes into account the counter-factual, and hence, provides the 
net impact of project intervention upon the lives and livelihoods of project beneficiaries. The 
results are presented below in Tables 9 through to 13 including standard errors of differences 
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in means and proportions with associated t-values in parentheses in the last column7. Whether 
the results are statistically significant or not have also been identified in the table with ** as 
significant at 5% level and * as significant at 10% level. In order to check the robustness of 
the results obtained through taking double differences of means or proportions of the 
variables under consideration, we have also carried out difference-in-difference regressions. 
The results are presented in Appendix 1 (Table 5.1 to Table 5.5) in the Technical Report.  
 
Regression results confirm the findings obtained through taking double differences of means 
or proportions as reported in Tables 9 through 13. Although the magnitude of the findings are 
somewhat different in the regressions results8, the statistical significance remains the same.  
In considering results, we need to keep in mind the framework of evaluation of the projects, 
namely:  
(a) the evaluation covered a two year period (2012-2014) while all of the projects had been or 
are being implemented over a longer time span; and  
(b) the baseline was carried out after all the projects had started;  
(c)  Project A2 had been completed before the baseline was carried out.  
 
The projects for the MDG component had been preselected and so the team had no control 
over points a to c. We should however consider the results and their statistical significance 
keeping the lack of uniformity of the assessment framework in mind. 
 
Project A2: Achieving Sustainable Livelihoods of the Poor Women  
Given the remarks above, the results for Project A2 indicate that it has been able to contribute 
significantly to improvements in land holding and also improvements in poverty status (Table 
9). Improvements clearly attributable to projects have also been noted in the areas of crisis 
coping mechanisms (i.e. able to use savings rather than reducing consumption and 
withdrawing children from school and sending them to work); access to various public 
services (public health, land office, micro finance institutions, etc.); and satisfaction with the 
                                                     
7 (i) Standard Error of the difference between means is calculated as: 
SEdiff = SQRT [(SE1)2 + (SE2)2] 
Where, SQRT = square root, SE1 = standard error of mean in sample 1, and SE2 = standard error of 
mean in sample 2. 
 
(ii) Standard Error of the difference between proportions is calculated as: 
SEdiff = SQRT [((p1(1-p1))/n1) + ((p2(1-p2))/n2)] 
Where, SQRT = square root, p1 = proportion in sample 1, p2 = proportion in sample 2, and n1 and n2 are 
sample size in samples 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
 
8 The regressions results are different because they only take into account the matching cases. 
Difference in Difference in means or proportions instead take into account all cases. 
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same services. The project has also contributed in undertaking collective community activities 
and women empowerment (Table 9) 
 
The reduction in the percentage of people self-reporting themselves as ‘extreme poor’ is 
clearly a headline result. This is consistent with the design of the project which intended to 
identify income earning opportunities for poor women. This has been successful and resulted 
in increased incomes and expenditures (Table 6 in the Technical Report). The SPO also 
works on a model which organises beneficiaries into self-help groups or samities.  One of the 
aims of the samity  model is to promote collective action and lobbying especially around 
access to key services. The findings from Table 9 as well as our qualitative interviews 
indicate that this has been a successful strategy, and that respondents are significantly more 
satisfied with key services. Finally, there are some important results in terms of women’s 
empowerment with women beneficiaries reporting more decision-making power at household 
and community levels, and greater levels of mobility. 
 
Project A3: Rural Development Program – Ensuring democracy, accountability and rights  
Accounting for counter-factuals, Project A3 has contributed to improving education levels 
(i.e. completed years of schooling), land holding, and improvement in poverty status (Table 
10). Improvements attributable to project interventions have also been noted in the areas of 
being able to save money (total amount), access to various public services with satisfaction, 
participation in organizations, and empowerment of women in respect of increased decision-
making abilities (Table 10). 
 
Project A3 is implemented by one of the oldest SPOs in Bangladesh and the project area is an 
area where the SPO has been working almost since its establishment. The SPO is known for 
its strong rights based approach and its focus on securing access to public land and resources, 
as well as key social services. This is in short a social mobilization organisation and the 
closest we have to a membership based organisation. Significant results in increased land 
ownership (usually khas or government owned land distributed to the poorest), increased 
savings (supported by membership of samities), access to key public services (health) and 
satisfaction with these (the legal system) are all very consistent with the SPO’s approach and 
its track record. At the same time, the positive results related to household participation in 
external organisations and the significant results in terms of increased female participation 
and decision-making within households and the community reflect again the SPO’s track 
record in a rights focussed development agenda and its support for poor women. 
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Project A1: Girl Power Project  
As indicated above, Project A1 is a new or innovative kind of project in Bangladesh9. Its 
focus on gender-based violence also means that the project engages with culturally sensitive 
issues. However, as observed from difference-in-difference analyses, the project has been 
able to raise awareness as well as participation and decision-making abilities of beneficiary 
girls and young women. Importantly it has also had a significant impact in reducing key 
violations of rights related to gender based violence such as torture, loss of dignity and so 
forth (Table 11). Beneficiary levels of education have also increased, and beneficiary 
households’ economic status has improved. Improvements attributable to project 
interventions have also been noted in the areas of sharing household responsibilities with 
other members (i.e. not burdening young girls only with roles traditionally given to females 
such as caring for household members which then prevents them from following other 
activities such as schooling) and access to media. Some improvements have also been noted 
in raising awareness about consequences and risks of early marriage, dowry, early pregnancy, 
etc. The project has also contributed to improved understanding and practices among the 
beneficiary girls and young women in relation to gender equity, participation in household 
decision making, mobility, and rights. 
 
Project A1 had not been completed before we carried out the end-line survey. As indicated 
above, this meant that the SPO was still carrying out key project activities. At one level this 
could help explain why there are significant differences in some of the questions around 
awareness raising, and why there are significant results in areas such as spending time at 
school and less time doing ‘traditional female roles’ such as food preparation and fuel 
collection alone. Some of the questions around ‘decision making’ especially within 
households and communities do not give significant results. Our qualitative interviews would 
suggest that this might reflect the fact that the project engages with culturally sensitive issues 
around gender roles and responsibilities, and that the beneficiaries are adolescent girls who 
traditionally in Bangladesh refer mostly to male guardians for key decisions. 
 
Project A4: Unite for Body Rights – Christian Hospital Chandraghona (CHC) Project  
Project A4 is also a new and somewhat innovative intervention that has been undertaken to 
improve awareness and services about sexuality and reproductive health among adolescents. 
Like Project A1, it therefore engages with issues which are very culturally sensitive.  
 
                                                     
9 By new or innovative, we refer to the fact that there are not many similar programmes in the country, 
and also the implementation of such programmes are challenging in the social, cultural, religious 
context of Bangladesh. 
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The double difference analysis shows significant impact at household levels on health status, 
food security, views on the quality of services from the hospital, use of ante and post-natal 
services (Table 12). In terms of the adolescents, the analysis shows significant impact on 
awareness of risks and consequences of early marriage, pregnancy and dowry; knowledge of 
family planning methods and pregnancy as well as sexual and reproductive health; the 
consequences of non-registration of births; equality between men and women in relation to 
wages, food consumption, inheritance, education, medical care, and participation in 
committees (Table 13).  
 
Again project A4 was still being implemented when we carried out the surveys. Our 
qualitative interviews confirmed our quantitative analysis in that there was a strong 
endorsement of the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the different trainings and 
awareness raising activities around health and sexual and reproductive rights. These activities 
were still being offered when we carried out the survey. At the household level, beneficiary 
households reported improved health status, and use as well as satisfaction with hospital 
services. The hospital has been servicing local communities for many years. It has a very 
strong reputation as a good hospital. The results seem to confirm this, and pick up on this 
reputation. 
 
Table 9: Sustainable Livelihoods of the Poor Women (Project A2) 
 
Indicators 
Difference in difference (2014-2012)  
Program 
Compari-
son 
Double 
difference 
Standard 
Error  
(t-value) 
Land ownership  (in decimals)  
-           Average homestead land 0.27 0.03 0.24** 
0.10 
(2.42) 
Economic status - self assessment (% of households)  
-          Extreme poor -27.83 -13.8 -14.03** 
0.05 
(2.82) 
Crisis coping mechanisms at household level. Multiple responses (%)  
-          Use of savings 3.12 -11.62 14.74** 
0.03 
(4.22) 
-          Reduces food consumption -41.68 -32.23 -9.45 
0.06 
(1.54) 
-          Reduces other expenses -24.33 -18.53 -5.8 
0.05 
(1.12) 
-          Withdraw of children temporarily 
from school 
-2 0 -2* 
0.01 
(1.78) 
-          Sending children to work -7.1 2.83 -9.93** 0.03 
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(3.76) 
Proportion of households accessing services (% of households)  
-          Public health service 11.24 4.4 6.84** 
0.03 
(2.10) 
-          Land office 8.5 -1.3 9.8** 
0.03 
(3.92) 
-          Micro finance institutes/NGOs 72.06 28.6 43.46** 
0.06 
(7.52) 
-          Services from Union Parishads 6.83 5.8 1.03 
0.03 
(0.33) 
Level of satisfaction (% of those households which accessed a service)  
Public health service  
-          Fully satisfied 4.64 0.89 3.75* 
0.02 
(1.94) 
Public education  
-          Partially satisfied 14.59 1.16 13.43** 
0.03 
(4.44) 
Land office  
-          Fully satisfied 11.76 -3.19 14.95** 
0.03 
(4.79) 
Micro finance institutes/NGOs  
-          Fully satisfied -0.54 -5.88 5.34** 
0.02 
(2.20) 
Social safety net program  
-          Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied -2.33 -16.45 14.12** 
0.04 
(3.62) 
Police  
-          Partially satisfied -42.9 -60 17.1** 
0.06 
(2.71) 
Court  
-          Partially satisfied 16.17 -11.93 28.1** 
0.04 
(6.41) 
Union Parishad  
-          Partially satisfied -19.1 -36.47 17.37** 
0.06 
(3.02) 
Reasons for not being able to access services (% of  households who had tried  
but failed) 
 
-          Due to poverty -22.86 0 -22.86** 
0.03 
(6.80) 
-          Because of being female 4.76 -5.36 10.12** 
0.03 
(3.58) 
Involvement with collective community activities? (% of households)  
-          Yes 1.2 -5.2 6.4** 
0.02 
(2.68) 
Female participation in household decision making (% of households)  
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-          Not at all -1.35 1.4 -2.75* 
0.01 
(1.84) 
-          Can do alone 12.09 9.7 2.39 
0.04 
(0.61) 
-          Along with husband -15.23 -13.6 -1.63 
0.04 
(0.36) 
-          Along with household members 4.4 2.5 1.9 
0.02 
(0.84) 
Female participation in decision making of village/community (% of households)  
-          Not at all -20.39 -16.6 -3.79 
0.05 
(0.77) 
-          Can do alone 12.15 3.3 8.85** 
0.03 
(2.80) 
 
Female participation in choosing family planning methods (% of households)  
-          Can do alone 0.59 -4.5 5.09** 
0.02 
(2.35) 
Female participation in  decision making around children’s’ education (% of 
households) 
 
-          Not at all -1.26 4.1 -5.36** 
0.02 
(2.46) 
-          Can do alone 2.51 -5.1 7.61** 
0.03 
(3.01) 
Female participation in decision making around children’s’ marriage (%of 
households) 
 
-          Not at all 0.62 4.1 -3.48* 
0.02 
(1.67) 
-          Can do alone -0.01 -4.4 4.39** 
0.02 
(2.14) 
Female able to go to relatives house (% of households)  
-          Can do alone 3.43 -0.9 4.33** 
0.02 
(2.50) 
Female able to go to the hospital (% of households)  
-          Not at all -22.59 -20.2 -2.39 
0.05 
(0.45) 
-          Can do alone 6.73 1.9 4.83** 
0.02 
(2.00) 
 
Table 10: Rural Development Program (Project A3) 
 
Indicators 
Difference in difference 
(2014-2012) 
 
Program 
Compari-
son 
Double 
difference 
Standard 
error 
(t-value) 
Education (% of all members aged 15 years  and above)  
-          Average years of schooling (15 
years of age and above) 
0.26 0.15 0.11** 
0.02 
(4.68) 
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Land Ownership (in decimals)  
-           Average homestead land 0.68 -0.25 0.93** 
0.03 
(27.08) 
-           Average cultivable land 1.87 -0.15 2.02** 
0.15 
(13.49) 
-          Permanently leased in khas land 3.42 -0.40 3.83** 
0.12 
(30.86) 
Economic status - self assessment (% of households)  
-          Poor -5.02 5.18 -10.2** 
0.03 
(3.83) 
Savings of households (in Taka)10   
-          Average amount of savings in last 
year 
1435.8 246.2 1189.6** 
194.98 
(6.10) 
Proportion of household accessing services (% of households)  
-          Public health service 4.83 -11.91 16.74** 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-          Land office 2.09 0.47 1.62 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-          Services from Union Parishads 34.66 31.78 2.88 
0.06 
(0.06) 
Level of satisfaction (% of those households who accessed services)   
Public education  
-          Fully satisfied 7.54 -12.42 19.96** 
0.04 
(5.37) 
Land office  
-          Fully satisfied 0.79 0 0.79 
0.01 
(1.3) 
Court  
-          Fully satisfied 10.03 0 10.03** 
0.02 
(4.60) 
Household current involvement with club, organization, cooperative society, UP 
committees or any other organization (% of households) 
 
-          Yes 2.01 -1.82 3.83** 
0.02 
(2.33) 
If yes, degree of participation in those activities (% of those involved)  
-          Key role in the decision making 16 -14.29 30.29** 
0.04 
(7.04) 
Household current involvement in self-help groups (% of households)  
-          Yes 2.28 -0.93 3.21** 
0.01 
(2.25) 
If yes, degree of participation in this activity (% of those involved)  
-          Participate in the discussion 
actively 
36.63 0 36.63** 
0.03 
(10.48) 
                                                     
10 1 US $ = 80 Taka  
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Received training from NGO or other organization during last 5 years (% of 
households) 
 
-          Yes 3.67 -1.01 4.68** 
0.02 
(2.80) 
Female participation in village/community decision making (% of households)  
-          Can do alone 9.22 0 9.22** 
0.02 
(4.39) 
Female participation in decision making around children’s’ education (% of 
households) 
 
-          Can do alone -10.46 -19.36 8.9** 
0.04 
(2.01) 
Female operating business/income generating activates (% of households)  
-          Can do alone 13.73 5.73 8.0** 
0.03 
(2.38) 
 
Table 11: Girl Power Program (Project A1) 
 
Indicators 
Difference in Difference 
(2014-2012) 
 
Program 
Compari-
son 
Double 
difference 
Standard 
error 
(t-value) 
Schooling (years)  
Average completed years of schooling 1.93 0.91 1.02** 
0.02 
(44.92) 
Household expenditure (in Taka)  
Average monthly expenditure of  the 
household 
2913.1 1775.0 1138.1** 
57.60 
(19.75) 
Food condition (% of households)  
Always in deficit -6.64 -8.32 1.68 
0.03 
(0.54) 
Sometimes in deficit -31.77 -13.75 -18.02** 
0.05 
(3.92) 
Water fetching (in minutes)  
Time (minutes) spent per day to collect  
water 
-9.94 -10.75 0.81** 
0.27 
(3.00) 
Care giving (in minutes)  
Average time (in minutes) spent daily to 
care for children, ill and older members 
of household 
24.81 49.88 -25.07** 
1.75 
(14.34) 
Access to the following Media for information/communication (% of 
respondents) 
 
Cell phone 0.37 -5.51 5.88** 
0.03 
(2.06) 
Radio 4.71 2.95 1.76 
0.03 
(0.52) 
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Consequences of early marriage (Multiple Responses - %)  
Harmful effect on health 17.22 6.81 10.41** 
0.04 
(2.93) 
Adverse impact on education 0.47 -0.23 0.7 
0.01 
(1.06) 
Can’t look after family properly 1.95 -1.98 3.93** 
0.02 
(2.43) 
Can’t take proper care of children 3.03 2.52 0.51 
0.02 
(0.27) 
Types of risk for early pregnancy (Multiple Responses - %)  
Death of mother 15.92 3.16 12.76** 
0.03 
(4.17) 
Death of children 24.68 17.94 6.74 
0.05 
(1.44) 
Poor health of mother and children 33.2 18.96 14.24** 
0.05 
(2.89) 
Weak/sick child 39.58 34.75 4.83 
0.06 
(0.86) 
Decision making  around buying daily food and  necessities for  the household (% 
of respondents) 
 
Jointly with other male members of the 
household 
18.08 14.14 3.94 
0.04 
(0.93) 
All members  of the household 22.03 11.11 10.92** 
0.04 
(2.64) 
Able to go to the hospital (% of respondents)  
Can go alone 20.41 7.22 13.19** 
0.04 
(3.53) 
Able to go to get services from different sources (% of respondents)  
Can go alone -0.96 -4.9 3.94* 
0.02 
(1.87) 
Received training from any NGO or other organization during last 2 years (% of 
respondents) 
 
Yes 17.38 -15.16 32.54** 
0.04 
(7.61) 
Received training during last 2 years (no. of training days)  
Self-defence training 1.26 -1 2.26** 
0.01 
(294.79) 
Awareness and  protection of right 4.09 2.4 1.69** 
0.02 
(93.07) 
Management and technical skill 5.66 1.86 3.8** 
0.01 
(291.27) 
Types of violation of rights experienced (Multiple Responses - %)  
Negligence or discriminatory behaviour from 
family 
28.25 36.4 -8.15 
0.05 
(1.49) 
Physical torture -10.5 12.6 -23.1** 
0.04 
(6.14) 
Having involuntarily pregnancy or abortion -1.3 0.46 -1.76* 
0.01 
(1.73) 
Abuse for giving birth of  a girl-child 0 2.66 -2.66* 0.01 
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(1.79) 
Mental torture/abuse -11.57 -16.54 4.97 
0.04 
(1.21) 
Deprived of social status/dignity -28 -19.1 -8.9* 
0.05 
(1.84) 
Faced social deprivation/discrimination -21.3 -19.1 -2.2 
0.05 
(0.47) 
 
Table 12: Unite for Body Rights – CHC Project (Household) (Project A4) 
 
Indicators 
Difference in difference 
(2014-2012) 
 
Program 
Compari-
son 
Double 
difference 
Standard 
Error  
(t-value) 
Health status (% of all members)  
-          Physically fit for work 3.11 -18.16 21.27** 
0.04 
(5.28) 
Immunization (% of households with under 5 children)  
-          % of household with children aged<5 
years having vaccines for measles? 
20.02 4.1 15.92** 
0.04 
(4.27) 
Food availability during last year (% of  households)  
-          Always in deficit 2.33 1.12 1.21 
0.02 
(0.76) 
-          Sometimes in deficit -2.45 11.87 -14.32** 
0.03 
(4.21) 
Response on the Quality of Service: Christian Hospital Chandraghona (CHC) 
(% of respondents who received services) 
 
-          Good service delivery 12.64 -4.5 17.14** 
0.03 
(5.14) 
-          Good behaviour of doctors/service 
providers 
12.54 -4.5 17.04** 
0.03 
(5.12) 
-          Good behaviour of the support staff 7.03 -4.5 11.53** 
0.03 
(4.01) 
-          Cleanliness 27.32 -4.5 31.82** 
0.04 
(7.79) 
-          Confidentiality of treatment 24.27 -4 28.27** 
0.04 
(7.22) 
-          Good quality of food 14.28 -4 18.28** 
0.03 
(5.40) 
-          Little waiting time  -1.24 -4.5 3.26 
0.02 
(1.47) 
-          Availability of service providers  4.17 -4.5 8.67** 
0.03 
(3.40) 
-          Availability of Medicines  -0.74 -4 3.26 
0.02 
(1.60) 
-          Availability of medical equipment  1.51 -4 5.51** 
0.02 
(2.56) 
 57 
-          Good quality of treatment 4.17 -4 8.17** 
0.02 
(3.28) 
Response on Cordiality of CHC personnel (% of respondents)  
-          Doctors  21.11 -5 26.11** 
0.04 
(6.72) 
-          Nurses 8 -4.5 12.5** 
0.03 
(4.22) 
-          Technicians 5.08 -4.5 9.58** 
0.03 
(3.57) 
-          Ward boys -4.2 -4.5 0.3 
0.03 
(0.12) 
-          Administrative staff 5.18 -4.5 9.68** 
0.03 
(3.60) 
Use of Antenatal care (% of respondents)  
-          % of respondents who needed 
antenatal care during pregnancy? 
29.44 -7.58 37.02** 
0.04 
(8.30) 
Post-Natal Care (% of respondents)  
-          % of respondent who needed post-
natal care after delivery? 
38.35 2.4 35.95** 
0.04 
(8.66) 
 
Table 13: Unite for Body Rights – CHC Project (Adolescents) (Project A4) 
 
Indicators 
 
Difference in difference 
(2014-2012) 
 
Program 
Compari-
son 
Double 
difference 
Standard 
Error 
(t-value) 
Awareness Related Information:  
Opinion about early marriage (% of respondents)  
-          Harmful 9.2 -7.74 16.94** 
0.03 
(4.90) 
Consequences of early marriage (Multiple Responses, %)  
-          Early pregnancy 14.64 -2.48 17.12** 
0.03 
(5.40) 
-          Can’t adjust with husband properly 18.3 7.55 10.75** 
0.04 
(2.70) 
Opinion about early pregnancy (% of respondents)  
-          Risky 9.19 -7.04 16.23** 
0.03 
(4.82) 
Types of risk for early pregnancy (Multiple Responses, %)  
-          Death of mother 1.9 -27.11 29.01** 
0.04 
(6.52) 
-          Death of children 8.15 -21.01 29.16** 
0.05 
(6.47) 
-          Weak/sick child 23.09 14.6 8.49** 
0.05 
(1.78) 
 58 
Opinion about dowry during marriage (% of respondents)  
-          Shameful/unlawful 7.04 -16.68 23.72** 
0.04 
(5.72) 
Opinion about birth registration (% of respondents)  
-          Necessary 2.86 -14.07 16.93** 
0.04 
(4.67) 
Mode of  washing hands after  defecation (% of respondents)  
-          With soap 3.54 -11.83 15.37** 
0.03 
(4.44) 
Is there any law to protect from violence against women? (% of respondents)  
-          Yes 12.6 3.06 9.54** 
0.03 
(3.07) 
Opinion about comparative wage of men and women in the work place (% of 
respondents) 
 
-          Both equally  5.67 -13.85 19.52** 
0.04 
(5.11) 
Opinion about boys and girls food consumption in the family (% of respondents)  
-          Both equally  -0.01 -13.05 13.04** 
0.03 
(3.98) 
Opinion about distribution of inherited properties between men  and women (% 
of respondents) 
 
-          Both equally 82.87 58.86 24.01** 
0.06 
(4.27) 
Opinion about education provision for boys and girls (% of respondents)  
-          Both equally 97.86 84.15 13.71** 
0.04 
(3.68) 
Opinion about medical treatment for boys and girls (% of respondents)  
-          Both equally 0.66 -10.3 10.96** 
0.03 
(3.63) 
Opinion about comparative participation of boys and girls in local 
association/club/committee (% of respondents) 
 
-          Both equally 67.9 57.64 10.26** 
0.06 
(1.70) 
Knowledge about Family Planning Methods (% of respondents)  
% of respondents who had heard about 
family planning methods 
20.58 -10.25 30.83** 
0.04 
(7.10) 
Views on usefulness of family planning methods: (Multiple responses, %)  
-          Increase the solvency of the 
households 
6.86 -24.48 31.34** 
0.05 
(6.77) 
-          Advantageous to educate the children -9.08 11.7 -20.78** 
0.04 
(5.39) 
-          Children have better health and 
nutrition 
3.89 -0.37 4.26** 
0.02 
(2.61) 
-          Mother’s health and nutrition is 
ensured 
24.14 17.58 6.56 
0.05 
(1.31) 
Views about problems of family planning methods: (Multiple responses, %)  
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-          Side effects 8.6 33.6 -25.0** 
0.05 
(4.91) 
-          Risk of infertility 19.68 35.7 -16.02** 
0.06 
(2.86) 
-          Husband does not like them 13.01 31.03 -18.02** 
0.05 
(3.45) 
Opinion about giving birth in quick succession (Multiple responses, %)  
-          Benefits of a large family -8.91 3.89 -12.8** 
0.03 
(4.37) 
-          Leads to poor health of mother and 
children 
10.43 -10.21 20.64** 
0.04 
(5.43) 
-          Economic burden 27.97 -3.27 31.24** 
0.04 
(7.93) 
-          Inadequate birth spacing 23.97 13.48 10.49** 
0.05 
(2.22) 
-          Don’t know 1.52 12.92 -11.4** 
0.03 
(3.36) 
Knowledge about specific family planning methods (% of respondents)  
-          Pill/edible tablet -3 -22.6 19.6** 
0.04 
(4.58) 
-          Emergency pill 4.66 17.38 -12.72** 
0.04 
(3.15) 
-          IUD/Copper T 26.72 -3.72 30.44** 
0.04 
(7.72) 
-          Injection/Depo 11.13 -7.75 18.88** 
0.04 
(5.26) 
-          Condom 17.06 -1.7 18.76** 
0.03 
(5.83) 
-          Implant/Norplant 28.07 -4.61 32.68** 
0.04 
(8.00) 
-          Safe period 14.81 -8.48 23.29** 
0.04 
(5.98) 
-          Azol 4.97 -2.8 7.77** 
0.02 
(3.31) 
-          Ligation/Tubectomy 10.08 4.28 5.8* 
0.03 
(1.88) 
-          Vasectomy/NSV 27.62 -11.19 38.81** 
0.05 
(8.31) 
Knowledge of options available to deal with unexpected pregnancy (% of 
respondents) 
 
-          MR /Menstruation regularization 13.25 -2.84 16.09** 
0.03 
(5.15) 
-          Abortion 4.91 -33.81 38.72** 
0.05 
(7.90) 
-          Consultation with doctors -12.79 5 -17.79** 
0.04 
(5.27) 
-          Do not know -5.31 28.8 -34.11** 
0.05 
(7.20) 
MR Related Awareness (% of respondents)  
% of the respondents who have heard about 
MR 
5.71 -12 17.71** 
0.04 
(4.86) 
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Knowledge about minimum period (weeks) of going for MR after becoming 
pregnant (% of respondents) 
 
-          Up to 8 to 10 weeks when provided 
by specialized provider (correct response) 
-1.47 -13.08 11.61** 
0.03 
(3.41) 
-          Others (incorrect response) -2.75 -5 2.25 
0.02 
(0.91) 
-          Do not know 4.13 18.08 -13.95** 
0.04 
(3.44) 
Knowledge about the source of MR services (% of respondents)  
-          Qualified doctor -21.33 -60.91 39.58** 
0.06 
(6.90) 
-          Nurse/Paramedic -37.87 -10.45 -27.42** 
0.05 
(5.66) 
-          Family welfare centre (FWC) -2.53 0 -2.53** 
0.01 
(2.04) 
-          Trained health worker -3.88 -10.44 6.56** 
0.03 
(1.97) 
-          Pharmacist 0.64 -2.9 3.54** 
0.02 
(2.03) 
-          Others 55.41 87.5 -32.09** 
0.05 
(6.33) 
-          CHC 8.92 0 8.92** 
0.02 
(3.97) 
Source of knowledge about MR (% of respondents)  
-          CHC-UBR training 35.92 -17.1 53.02** 
0.05 
(10.08) 
-          School 14.08 14.75 -0.67 
0.04 
(0.15) 
-          Friends/family -5.49 3.53 -9.02** 
0.03 
(3.56) 
-          Community meetings -15.8 -2.9 -12.9** 
0.03 
(3.90) 
-          Health centre -1.97 9.68 -11.65** 
0.03 
(3.79) 
-          Health worker 8.59 4.79 3.8 
0.03 
(1.25) 
-          NGO 1.79 0 1.79* 
0.01 
(1.71) 
-          Poster/leaflet 0.45 22.17 -21.72** 
0.04 
(5.33) 
Awareness about STD, HIV and Safe Sex (% of respondents)  
% of the respondents knows about STD 15.21 -12.37 27.58** 
0.04 
(3.89) 
% of the respondents knows about HIV 1.34 -30.98 32.32** 
0.04 
(0.35) 
% of the respondents knows about safe sex 29.35 -9.81 39.16** 
0.04 
(7.94) 
Actions when faced with problems related to puberty, sexual and reproductive 
health (Multiple response, %) 
 
-          consult with CHC/UBR representative 49.19 -6.6 55.79** 
0.05 
(12.08) 
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-          discuss with class mates/friends 14.05 -11.72 25.77** 
0.04 
(6.20) 
-          discuss with family member 5.9 -7.98 13.88** 
0.03 
(4.31) 
-          discuss with others 5.54 1.97 3.57 
0.02 
(1.59) 
-          Not to discuss with anybody and keep 
quite 
-2.1 0 -2.1* 
0.01 
(1.86) 
-          Do not know -3.93 20.89 -24.82** 
0.04 
(5.86) 
Is there any institution available in your area which provides advice/counselling 
services related to puberty, sexual and reproductive health (% of respondents) 
 
-          Yes 31.15 6.88 24.27** 
0.04 
(5.51) 
Types of institutions available (Multiple responses, %)  
-          CHC/UBR 50.12 -74.1 124.22** 
0.06 
(21.42) 
-          Public health centre 45.34 46.77 -1.43 
0.06 
(0.23) 
-          Private organization 21 -0.76 21.76** 
0.03 
(6.56) 
-          Others 6.1 0 6.1** 
0.02 
(3.23) 
-          Do not know -29.03 9.59 -38.62** 
0.05 
(8.43) 
 
5.3 Capacity Development  
This was measured between baseline and end line across the following 5 organisational 
capabilities on a 1(low) to 5(high) scale developed by ECDPM: 
 
 To adapt and renew 
 To act and commit 
 To deliver on development objectives 
 To relate to external stakeholders 
 To achieve coherence 
 
Table 14: Summary of aggregated scores across the 5 capabilities for each 
organisation 
 
Organisation Baseline aggregated 
score 2012 
End line 
aggregated score 
2014 
Capability 
Change 
PAB 4.12 3.96 Decrease of   0.16 
CDD 3.7 4.5 Increase of    0.80 
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AOSED 2.8 2.98 Increase of    0.18 
SUPRO 3.18 3.74 Increase of    0.56 
VERC 3.4 3.88 Increase of    0.48 
   
 
For Practical Action Bangladesh and AOSED, the difference between these scores over the 
time period is insignificant. While more significant for CDD, SUPRO and VERC, there are 
internal variations. The MFS II financial contribution to CDD and VERC was 4-6% and 3% 
respectively over the period. Only SUPRO results with 95% funding from MFS II can 
therefore be realistically attributed to MFS II support via Impact Alliance (Oxfam-Novib). 
The qualified successes of CDD and VERC are more attributed to longer standing 
relationships with donors: for CDD the ICCO Alliance (Light for the World); and for VERC, 
CordAid. 
 
While there is less change to attribute for the cases of Practical Action Bangladesh and 
AOSED, each has a specific story. Practical Action Bangladesh is part of Practical Action UK 
and thus supported closely as part of that international structure, requiring less organisational 
capacity development support from WASH Alliance (WASTE), and indeed the internal 
structure of WASH Alliance, with Simavi in the lead, was according to some in Practical 
Action Bangladesh, difficult to navigate. AOSED was 100% funded by MFS II at the 
beginning of the period, but had its funding discontinued in 2013. It claims to have 
experienced problems of capacity support from Simavi – a claim Simavi contends. What is 
clear is that AOSED was in need of strong and sustained capacity development and it is not 
clear that the appropriate levels were provided. Simavi has continued its capacity 
development support (although it has discontinued funds) by recruiting a VSO volunteer for 
AOSED. It is too early to see how successful this will be.  
 
Thus from these 5 cases, the positive contribution story for MFS II really only applies to 
SUPRO in terms of linking capacity outcomes to direct capacity building interventions. 
However the positive CDD and VERC outcomes can be plausibility linked to longer standing 
relations with Dutch agencies (for CDD LFTW prior to ICCO, and CordAid respectively), 
with MFS II providing the opportunity for a continuing Dutch agency engagement, albeit 
minor in terms of funding. The success of CDD and VERC in diversifying their funding 
sources and thus enhancing their sustainability can be seen as a function of long term support 
from inception to a weaning off dependency. This conclusion is also consistent with the 
notion that change is more a function of long term relationships rather than recent, shorter 
ones, and that the creation of stable, flexible partnerships may be much more conducive to 
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capacity development than more targeted capacity building – at least for more well-
established and mature organisations such as those covered in this evaluation. 
 
Turning to SUPRO, there were positive responses from its major stakeholders, evidenced 
through improved relationships with local government across the country and evidence of 
joint events, campaigns, etc. (see Tax campaign and SUPRO members joining government 
health and education committees). SUPRO has also made steady progress over time both in 
terms of its own institutional development but also its impact in its priority areas. It is worth 
noting the slow steady growth of partners, and that the founders and majority of Council 
members are not from the Dhaka NGO elite, but represent the 45 districts of Bangladesh. 
 
With this mixed picture, what overall conclusions can be drawn? 
 
With the exception of SUPRO and AOSED, much of the MFS II funding was a small 
proportion of the total incomes of the local partners (SPOs), though often a function of longer 
term, prior relationships with Dutch aid via INGOs. Thus in this period, the SPOs were 
already positively reflecting diversification of income flows and thus sustainability by 
reducing the risk of over-dependency. While this pattern may undermine the desire to 
measure and attribute the impact of MFS II over a two year (2012-2014) precise period, the 
value of Dutch aid itself is not necessarily undermined. 
 
It seems clear that the 2 year time period for measurement and attribution of change could not 
be expected to reveal significant impact upon the 5 capabilities, since these two years are for 
some SPOs nested within longer relations going back a decade or more, like between VERC 
and Cordaid. Cordaid is credited by informants as having introduced new ideas to VERC, 
especially a shift from group to community based strategy. Again this is not a negative 
statement on MFS II per se, merely a logical observation that in the context of longer standing 
relationships, only incremental shifts could possibly be detected. For the larger measured 
increases, there are aggregate capability improvements between 14 (VERC) and 21% (CDD), 
but the most reliable attribution is SUPRO at 17% due to its funding dependency. 
 
A further problem derived from the measurement methodology is again not necessarily a poor 
reflection on the CFA-SPO relationship. The MFS II templates for capacity development 
measurement (from within a Theory of Change perspective) assumed that specific objectives 
were consciously elaborated for each Dutch supported project, along with the related 
assumption that all projects fitted at least one or more of the three key areas (components): 
contribution of MDGs; civil society strengthening; and SPO capacity development. Many of 
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the funded projects did not actually have concrete goals in these areas, especially the second 
two. Thus under capacity development, few of the cases had mutually agreed objectives 
sufficiently explicit to permit confident contribution analysis to an objective. There is simply 
a loose correlation between some SPO improvement and some CFA participation via present 
MFS II funding and history. 
 
Interestingly there is some evidence of reverse capacity development where an SPO was part 
of another well-established INGO than the MFS II CFA. Thus CDD draws strongly for its 
approach from its connections to ADD, and has thus been able to share ideas about practice 
with its CFA—Light for the World. At the same time, CDD has been assisted in proposal 
writing, which has improved its non-MFS II funding during the measurement period. 
Practical Action Bangladesh, as part of Practical Action UK, has access to wider experience 
and has been able to feed that back to WASH Alliance and WASTE. At the same time, 
WASTE has contributed some innovative ideas such as the diamond model of business on the 
faecal sludge and management services. The Practical Action Bangladesh connection to 
WASTE has assisted the Practical Action Bangladesh profile and contributed to its access to 
both government and Melinda Gates Foundation funds. 
5.4 Civil Society Strengthening  
 
In comparison with other funders who do not incorporate a strengthening civil society 
component to their funding, the MFS II scheme is largely recognized as a more holistic way 
of influencing local stakeholders’ mindsets and institutions. At the same time, the most 
significant changes observed within the SPOs themselves across the two-year period are hard 
to interpret because achieving observable impact through civil society strengthening requires 
both sufficient money and time. Therefore the major findings highlighted below, based on the 
two rounds of CIVICUS scoring, must be interpreted carefully and contextualized. 
 
In general, as Table 15 shows, the funded SPOs scored increasingly high on civic 
engagement, practice of values and perception of impact with average scores improving from 
1.3 to 1.5, 1.6 to 2 and 1.8 to 2. The overall absence of changes in the level of organization 
indicates that the SPOs have reached a level of maturity and have stable relationships with 
other relevant actors. This lack of improvement may also suggest that the SPOs, on average, 
are not proactive in engaging with a large number of networks and umbrella institutions. 
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Table 15: Summary of CIVICUS scoring against 5 aggregate headings 2012-2014 
 Average 2012 Average 2014 
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 1.3 1.5 
LEVEL OF ORGANISATION 1.5 1.5 
PRACTICE OF VALUES 1.6 2 
PERCEPTION OF IMPACT 1.8 2 
ENVIRONMENT 1.6 1 
 
Table 16 summarizes the average CIVICUS scoring per SPO, and detailed scoring by each of 
the 16 SPOs for each sub-indicator of the 5 aggregate indicators can be found at Appendix 1.  
The range of interventions delivered by the 16 SPOs is broad. Some SPOs (for example the 
Girl Power Project implemented by ACD, Aparajeyo and BNWLA or the health services and 
activities delivered by Caritas, CSS, DSK, FPAB or VARD) seek to transform mindsets in 
order to achieve better gender equity through direct service provision. Other SPOs adopt a 
rights-based approach to transform political structures and enforce constitutional rights 
(AOSED, CDD, ADD, SUPRO and UTTARAN). The former are often referred to as 
‘intermediation’ SPOs in that they aim to fill the gaps in public services whereas the latter, 
‘mobilisation’ SPOs adopt a far-reaching strategy that aims to compel duty bearers to be more 
accountable to citizens in the longer-term. Furthermore our summary analysis indicates that 
SPOs that are “owned” by their representative members (normally under the guise of a 
“grassroots platform” or a membership based organisation) score higher than other SPOs. 
This we argue is because the processes of including target groups in the analysis are easily 
implemented and costs associated with it are lower. 
 
However, unlike the capacity development component the ‘strengthening civil society’ 
component’s outcome is less under the control of the SPO and more likely to be affected by 
the external environment in which the SPO operates. This has been a major factor in the 
precise period of this study as indicated in the ‘relevant context’ section of this overview 
paper. This externality is unambiguously and consistently revealed by the drop across the 16 
SPOs in the disaggregated and aggregated environment scores from 1.6 to 1.0. 
 
Even without political disturbances and violence, Bangladesh is a difficult environment for 
new NGOs or mature NGOs willing to work on new issues. Well-known NGOs have long-
established personal relationships built across civil society to policy-making, and the strength 
of these relations can create barriers to entry for newer NGOs who want to build ties across 
different dimensions of civil society. This reflects some element of the social capital problem 
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whereby the intense strength felt by those on the ‘inside’ results in those outside being 
excluded. 
 
However laid on top of this inherent structural problem of the exclusion of new entrant SPOs, 
the conditions for a flourishing civil society in general and the NGO environment in particular 
has been affected by political turmoil and disturbance affecting the country since September 
2013 in the run-up to the January 2014 ‘election’ in which the opposition coalition refused to 
participate because a neutral caretaker government had not been installed. This disruption 
took the form of hartals and blockades and street violence alongside killings not only of 
political adversaries but also civil society actors (such as NGO activists, leaders and 
journalists). This situation has returned one year later as we finalise the report (see ‘relevant 
context’ above). Significantly, the closing down of political space means that freedom to 
critique policy and openly advocate on rights issues is curtailed. Public criticism can be 
perceived as an attack upon the government. Thus SPOs supported by MFS II have had to be 
very cautious in pursuing their missions over the last 2 years because they fear reprisals if 
their civil society behaviour is identified as pro—opposition or anti-government. Certainly we 
conclude that the tense political climate at local and national levels has affected the room for 
manoeuvre for some of the SPOs in our sample, especially those with a more mobilization 
agenda (SUPRO, ASK, AOSED, Bangladesh News Network for example).  
 
Under these conditions there is a core problem of donor resolve and morality. There has been 
a long standing problem in Bangladesh of donor volatility in the context of partner NGOs 
which take risks in pursuit of rights based agendas. In a hostile socio-political environment at 
local as well as national levels, where vested interests around rent-seeking are challenged and 
exposed, opponents of NGOs and CSOs assess the sustainability of their civil society actions.  
They ask: Will those annoying NGOs survive? Can individuals be bought off? Is their donor 
support precarious and thus their agendas and challenges able to be discounted? If long term, 
stable support is not signalled and actually available, then donors can rightly be accused of 
unethically exposing their local partners to high levels of risk in the pursuit of donor agendas. 
Donors of course are insulated from the same risk.   
 
It is not surprising to see that a few SPOs scorings have declined as for some of them the 
funding has either stopped completely or been significantly reduced (i.e. BNN, AOSED and 
Practical Action Bangladesh). The interruption of financial support in some cases when the 
SPO was highly dependent on MFS II, significantly affected the internal capacities of SPOs 
and their ability to plan strategically and engage with relevant stakeholders. We also need to 
factor in a more ‘normal’ institutional cycle in which funding supports more obvious early 
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activity (e.g. participating in or conducting civil society studies, data gathering and 
production of dissemination materials), followed by less fund dependent activity in later 
stages of sponsorship like dissemination through ongoing presence of staff in relevant 
networks as well as workshops, seminars and conferences. 
 
Thus the role of the CFAs and the nature of their relationships and commitment levels to the 
funded SPOs have a strong influence upon the efficacy of their financial contribution towards 
the expected outcomes of the partner SPO. A long-term, regular, flexible grant support 
combined with co-operative and mutually supportive long-term relationships not only creates 
a favourable learning environment where SPOs can learn and develop sustainable strategies 
(for example Light For The World and CDD), but it also signals strength and continued 
presence to both cooperating and hostile actors in their field of operation. On the other hand, a 
tenuous and unpredictable ‘distance’ between the CFA and its SPO can perversely signal 
precariousness rather than independence and self-determination, thus weakening rather than 
strengthening the civil society context for that SPO. Tenuous and unpredictable flows of 
funding and other support can also entail weak monitoring and follow-up systems that support 
the strategic thinking of the SPO management. Uncertain financial relations, a lack of longer-
term commitment to a partnership, and insufficient high-quality strategic support can 
jeopardize the SPOs’ capacities to plan sustainable activities and increase their ‘political’ 
reliance on donors thereby putting them at risk. We have observed elements of this in 
AOSED and Practical Action Bangladesh. 
 
Shifting the focus of analysis from the risky, politicised rights domain towards the more 
technical, apolitical end of the policy agenda, there is an attribution problem in trying to trace 
the impact of small financial support upon big expectations for policy impact—the leverage 
efficiency calculation. For our sample, the percentage of MFS II funding to its SPOs has often 
been diluted by multiple sources of funding and consequently difficult to track for impact. For 
an SPO to have impact upon either the strength of civil society activity in its sector, or upon 
government policy more directly, long term relations between its staff and other established 
stakeholders in its ‘environment’ is required. Those staff need to be well educated as well as 
activists, they need to have credibility in order to have reputations which can be converted to 
influence. They have to be respected professionals, and thus adequately and securely 
rewarded. That entails significant levels of funding, often way beyond the MFS II/CFA flow. 
And if the NGO is isolated (geographically) or new to the field there is a need for further 
financial support to sustain and deepen impact (for example ACD). Ambitions in most of 
these SPO sectors cannot be realised on the cheap. And small donors cannot expect to 
exercise much leverage, unless their present reduced funding has followed on from much 
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longer and generous relationships. The Dutch relationship to Nijera Kori could be considered 
in this way. 
 
The openness of the institutional landscape in specific thematic sectors can vary significantly 
and therefore determine NGO outcome achievements in terms of influence on other 
institutions’ practices and policy. For example working in the sector of gender issues (such as 
ACD and Aparajeyo) might be slightly more open to changes than budget and taxation issues, 
such as SUPRO for example (which clearly challenge long-established structures and 
mindsets of the political elites). It is interesting in the presently charged political climate that 
the governing party, despite closing down the space for civil society and other democratic 
processes, remains strongly focussed upon poverty eradication and reaching other MDGs. For 
the first time, a background paper on extreme poverty has been requested as an input into the 
upcoming 7th Five Year Plan. Thus service delivering NGOs find they have more 
uncontroversial room for manoeuvre. The partial exception is that this government frowns 
upon micro-credit and MFIs, politically pursuing the Grameen Bank for malfeasance while 
grudgingly permitting the microfinance sector to continue. There has been a past history of 
pro-poor budget critique undertaken by campaigning NGOs (Proshika and Unnayan 
Shammanay) which has contributed to a receptivity about poverty eradication, but 
contemporary budget criticism is now a more difficult prospect. 
 
In terms of the primary MFS II concern with civil society strengthening, SPO mobilisation 
and intermediation activities are mainly focussed upon participating in campaigns as sole or 
co-organisers, on convening stakeholders from across different parts of civil society and 
government often at local levels (districts, upazilas and union- the primary level of local 
government), on attending seminars and conferences which attract press coverage, alongside 
actual service delivery in some sectors. Not many of them produce longer term reports, op-
eds and published studies based upon analysis of their frontline experience. They are not 
research organisations, communicating in different ways to a wider population. Many would 
like to have this capacity and extend this element of their portfolio, publishing from their 
knowledge and experience in working with civil society in particular thematic sectors and 
geographical locations. There is also the rapidly expanding potential of social media, although 
even now the governing party is trying to close down some of this social media space, using 
the threat of terrorism as an alibi. For ‘terrorism’ read ‘opposition parties’ denied legitimate 
political space to organise, protest and compete. 
 
Finally there is the SPO size variable which reappears in the capacity building summary 
analysis below. Large-scale, international NGOs (as SPOs for MFS II like Practical Action 
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Bangladesh) tend to be well-connected with other large scale funding agencies (either INGOs 
or donors through core funding or projects) and therefore have high standard reporting and 
accountability mechanisms since relationships with donors tend to be highly formalized. Even 
large, indigenous NGOs like Nijera Kori (included only in the MDG component) have long 
experience as part of wider networks positively affecting their ability to participate in wider 
forums which include the influencing of government and donors themselves as well as their 
peers across civil society. 
 
In smaller NGOs, a handful of senior staff carry the capacity burden to develop their networks 
and be active on national discussion platforms. A lot of their fund raising capacity, practice of 
values and advocacy influence relies upon this small, often ‘founding’ leadership for mission 
achievement. Thus the ability of SPOs to use MFSII funding is critical to gather sufficient 
internal resources to retain good quality strategic managers. These smaller SPOs rely heavily 
upon them to maintain and develop relevant capacity to engage in nation-wide dialogues and 
build long-term personal linkages with other institutions. This is essential for their 
sustainability and the effectiveness of their intervention either as mobilisation or 
intermediation SPOs. In another language, there is a single point of business failure for the 
smaller SPOs, and over the last few decades, we have witnessed this problem many times 
over. 
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Table 16: SPOs civicus aggregated changes 2012-2014
ACD ADD AOSED Aparajeyo ASK BNWLA CARITAS CDD CSS DSK FPAB BNN 
Practical 
Action SUPRO UTTARAN VARD 
+0.2 0 -0.4 0 +1.2 +0.4 0 +0.2 +0.1 0 -0.2 -0.2 +0.2 0 0 -0.2 
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6. Overall Assessment (answering evaluation questions by 
component)  
6.1 Conclusion 1: Conclusions to the three components  
6.1.1 MDG Component 
 
Relevance of the Results 
Achieving improvements in livelihoods; access to services and institutions; and women 
empowerment were among the main objectives of projects A2 and A3. As we have observed 
from both the analyses of changes over time and difference-in-difference, both projects have 
been quite successful in achieving the desired objectives. In this respect, the results have been 
relevant to the objectives of projects. 
 
For project A1, the objectives were to empower girls and young women by raising awareness, 
increasing participation, improving rights and nurturing empowerment. In terms of achieving 
stated objectives, the project results are very positive and relevant. Similarly, results achieved 
under project A4 are also relevant to the objectives stated for the project.  
 
 
Efficiency of the Projects 
Before evaluating the efficiency of the projects, we will review the intended outputs of the 
projects. Table 17 presents the outputs per project. An examination of the intended and actual 
outputs for each of the projects reveals that all of the planned outputs have been 
produced/achieved by the respective SPOs/NGOs. The implementation of project activities 
has also been successful. 
 
As we have also observed from results, the outputs produced/achieved under the projects have 
also been quite successful in achieving the desired objectives of the projects. This indicates a 
level of project efficiency. 
 
Footnote 5 in the Technical Report explains in some detail some of the challenges of 
targeting. In our analysis, it is clear that there is an inevitable slip in targeting. This is not 
uncommon in Bangladesh. So for example for project A2, we found that not all beneficiaries 
were poor or extreme poor at baseline. This could be seen as a case of mis-targeting. On the 
other hand we also saw in Project A3 that projects can have positive externalities with benefits 
reaching people who were not necessarily targeted. This is a contrasting example to project 
A3. In our view, the question of targeting is problematic anyway. In many cases, the 
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difference between an eligible beneficiary and an ineligible one is, in livelihood terms, quite 
negligible.  
 
Table 17: Outputs per Project 
Projects Outputs 
Project A2: 
Sustainable 
Livelihoods of the 
Poor Women 
 
1. Formation of women samities (groups). 
2. Organizing meetings and sessions to raise awareness 
among the target group beneficiaries on food security, 
disaster preparedness, and hygiene related issues. 
3. Providing training to the beneficiary women on livestock 
rearing, vegetable gardening, nursery development, seed 
management, organic farming and leadership 
management. 
4. Women group members received capital support.  
Project A3: Rural 
Development 
Program 
 
1. Formation of landless groups. 
2. Providing training to the landless groups on various 
issues.  
3. Conduct joint economic activities. 
4. Providing major empowerment support activities to the 
landless groups. 
Project A4: Unite 
for Body Rights – 
CHC Project 
1. Number of SRH outpatient treated. 
2. Number of SRH inpatient treated. 
3. CSE (Comprehensive Sexuality Education) groups 
formed. 
4. CSE sessions organized in schools. 
Project A1: Girl 
Power Program 
1. Groups of girls and young women identified as the target 
group. 
2. Organizing training for the girls and young women on 
“life skills”. 
3. Organizing mass awareness through TFD (Theatre for 
Development) live performance. 
4. Organizing child rights and child protection orientation 
sessions for government officials, local government 
representatives and CBOs. 
 
 
Discussion 
Before discussing the design and suitability of the projects, it is important to note the 
relation between evaluation period (i.e. 2012 through to 2014) and project 
implementation. Some of the projects started and were completed before the MFS II 
study (e.g., Projects A2 and A3), while others (e.g., Projects A1 and A4) started 
before the study but will be completed after the study deadline. So, we should bear in 
mind that the baseline does not fully capture the baseline situation as most of the 
projects started before the baseline survey was conducted (i.e. the baseline might 
already have captured some project impact) and the final follow up survey also does 
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not fully capture the project impact since two of the projects will continue beyond 
2014. So the interpretation of results, design and suitability should be considered 
with this in mind.  
 
All four projects have been/are being implemented properly and have also produced 
positive results for their beneficiaries. All the projects were relevant and suitable for 
the environment, although it was challenging to implement projects A1 and A4 
because of the sensitive nature of the interventions. Project A2 has been implemented 
in an adverse geographical region of the country (i.e. coastal areas). Project A3 has 
also demonstrated the positive impact of social mobilization on livelihoods 
improvements and MDG outcomes.  
 
Regarding impact evaluation, our conclusion is that impact evaluations need to be 
designed alongside project design so that randomized controls as well as proper 
baseline and follow up surveys can be conducted in order to capture the fuller impact 
of implemented projects. 
 
MDG Evaluation Conclusion 
 
The results obtained through the present evaluation of four MDG projects can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 The projects have been/are being implemented properly; 
 All the projects produced good and positive results; 
 Some key  results are attributable to project intervention; 
 The results obtained are relevant not only to project objectives, but also to 
the country context; 
 The projects were implemented efficiently; 
 The interventions provide important insights into the wider attempt to reduce 
poverty in Bangladesh.  If anything more interventions like the ones carried 
out by the SPOS will be needed in the future.  
 
Answers are also provided for the evaluation questions on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 
being “not at all” and 10 being “completely agree” with the following statements, for 
the projects under consideration. 
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Table 18: Summary Evaluation Scores: MDG component 
 
Statements regarding Evaluation Questions Projects 
A2 A3 A1 A4 
The project was well designed 10 10 9 10 
The project was implemented as designed 10 10 10 10 
The project reached all its objectives 9 9 9 10 
The observed results are attributable to the 
project interventions 
8 8 8 9 
The observed results are relevant to the project 
beneficiaries 
10 10 10 10 
The project was implemented efficiently 9 9 9 10 
 
 
6.1.2 Capacity Development Component 
To remind the reader, a total of five projects were pre-selected for evaluation under the 
capacity development sub-component. The concluding findings in relation to the evaluations 
questions are below. 
 
Centre for Disability in Development (CDD) Findings 
Overall the capacity development support provided to CDD has been effective and relevant. 
The Capability organisational assessment compared to the baseline assessment has highlighted 
improvement in all five capabilities and the organisational time line has highlighted growth in 
the organisation. The impact grid stories of change and contribution analysis have indicated 
impact of its work which can be traced back to the MFS II funding.  
 
The strategic relationship between CDD and LFTW - two organisations with similar goals, 
vision and Theory of Change - has contributed to the appropriate provision of capacity 
building support that is both useful and strategically well placed. There was also a reverse 
Capacity Development process from CDD to LFTW that strengthens the value of their long 
term strategic partnership. This relationship is all the more remarkable in that LFTW only 
provides between 4-6% of the overall budget of CDD. The two organisations have a strong 
long term partnership where both see they are learning from each other as both bring strengths 
to the relationship. 
 
An Organisation for Socio-Economic Development (AOSED) Findings 
Despite a positive start, the relationship between Simavi of the Dutch Wash Alliance and 
AOSED has not ended well. The decision not to continue funding has been a difficult one and 
has led to a situation in which both organisations have quite different views on the reasons for 
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discontinuation. In terms of capacity building at the time of the end study, one would have to 
conclude that the decision to discontinue funding has negatively impacted on AOSED’s 
capacity. However Simavi have recently contracted a VSO from the Netherlands to work with 
AOSED on its organisational strengthening. This had just started at the time of the evaluation, 
and therefore we are unable to comment on the suitability or effectiveness of such support. 
That AOSED managed to obtain funding and support from other donors and research 
organisations to continue its work and that it survived a real funding crisis is credit to the 
organisation and its leadership. 
 
 
Practical Action Bangladesh Findings 
The Capacity development support from the Dutch Wash Alliance has been to the Bangladesh 
Wash Alliance of which Practical Action Bangladesh is a member. As indicated above, 
Practical Action Bangladesh also received other capacity development inputs – some of which 
were specific to the organisation. However the number of staff members who accessed Wash 
Alliance support was very small and this has implications in terms of impact on the 
organisation overall.  Practical Action Bangladesh receives the majority of its capacity 
development support from Practical Action HQ and the Practical Action Alliance family. This 
is the major source of capacity development inputs for Practical Action Bangladesh, and any 
WASTE capacity development contribution has to be understood in this light. As indicated 
above however, staff at Practical Action Bangladesh were appreciative of some WASTE 
support such as the diamond business model developed by WASTE on the faecal sludge 
management services.  
 
It has been difficult to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of the capacity 
development support provided by WASTE and further support from the Wash Alliance. There 
was no real significant change between baseline and end-line assessments with a slight overall 
decrease of 0.6%. The narratives however do signal some improvements in the capabilities 
where scores have reduced. What was identified throughout the end-line self-assessment was 
that Practical Action Bangladesh has not particularly solved any of the problems identified in 
the baseline. The researchers would like to note this may be due to a weakness in the 
methodology when there is a high staff turnover and no real continuity between baseline and 
end line assessments.  
 
Practical Action is a large international NGO based in the UK. Although the UK based staff 
who work on the MFS II project are aware of what the Dutch funding supports, once you 
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interview other members of staff particularly at senior level you find that this is one of many 
projects they have to oversee. That is not to say they were not cooperative, they provided any 
information requested however the real understanding of the MFS II funded projects lies in 
the heads of a few key project staff. 
  
Sushasoner Jonny Procharavizan (SUPRO) Findings 
SUPRO is an impressive organisation comprising of a large number of members who 
contribute their time and other resources to SUPRO’s programme, whilst also gaining from 
the capacity building provided through SUPRO. They have had significant successes in 
several of their major campaigns including improved accountability of various local 
government programs and the fair tax campaign. The support from Oxfam/Novib has been 
crucial to this success - both the financial support plus enabling SUPRO to link to 
international campaigners on tax for example. The only concern is whether SUPRO can find 
alternative support post MFSII, given its excessive financial reliance on Oxfam/Novib. 
 
Village Education Centre (VERC) Findings 
VERC is credited for leading the way for many years in Bangladesh on informal education.  
Cordaid has been an active supporter for many years and VERC will point to many areas of 
key successes brought about through that support over this time in helping them develop 
organisationally and in their mode of work. However most of these changes were in the past 
and although VERC recognises this, it is hard to see how the same level of interaction  could 
have been continued by Cordaid once the financial and other support were significantly  
reduced under MFS II, to barely 3% of VERC’s overall income. Although nominally 
designated for capacity building there is little hard evidence that this was actually spent as a 
designated fund, rather than a general contribution to their positive capacity building work 
with communities, teachers, and local officials.  
 
6.1.3 Civil Society Strengthening Component 
It is difficult to summarise findings of strengthening civil society across 16 SPOs carrying out 
quite a diverse range of projects and activities. As indicated above, we have seen across our 
16 sample SPOs an average increase in civic engagement, practice of values and perception of 
impact. There has been no movement on level of organisation and a decrease in the score 
related to environment (see Table 17).  
 
The lack of change in the score related to the level of organisation is not a major concern. 
Many of the SPOs funded under MFS II are mature organisations and have good established 
practices. The decline in the environment score is more difficult to interpret. On the whole, it 
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seems that the low score picks up on the fact that the SPOs are not involved in studies on civil 
society in Bangladesh. To a great extent this is beyond their control. It highlights however a 
real lack of investment across the development sector for good quality research into civil 
society activity in Bangladesh. Given the overall political context we have sketched out above 
(see context section), we can only highlight the need to support and the value of more research 
into this area.  Included in the same score is a sub-item on influencing civil society. Here the 
scores across the SPOs are generally low (with few exceptions across SPOs). Our sense is that 
the move from mobilising orientations to intermediation ones also means that SPOs may 
become less interested in certain aspects of civil society strengthening. This is not unique to 
MFS II supported SPOs. Finally the low score on environment inevitably reflects aspects of 
the hostile context in which all the SPOs operate.  
 
The increased average scores across civic engagement, practice of values and perception of 
impact are quite remarkable given the context over the past 2 years. The environment for 
SPOs is particularly hostile. What the three themes have in common is SPO outreach and 
external engagement with target groups, other IOs, public and private sector representatives.  
Attributing the positive change to MFS11 funding however is not easy for a number of 
reasons. First, most if not all the SPOs do not separate out their budgets and activities so that 
the strengthening civil society component can be isolated from other activities. Second, as 
indicated above, the levels of funding to SPOs are in most cases relatively small and the 
amount then dedicated to strengthening civil society even smaller. This again is not 
necessarily a bad approach to follow. In many cases, it makes perfect sense to make 
contributions to mature SPOs who can be effective in their interventions. It does however 
make the question of attribution difficult. Whilst we have some cases where the level of 
funding makes attribution calculations slightly easier (e.g. SUPRO), in other cases, MFS II 
has bought into significant civil society strengthening leverage despite making relatively small 
investments.  
 
Our contribution analysis (i.e. thick cases) takes us some way forward in assessing plausible 
contributions of SPOs to observed changes. In all five cases, we examined in detail the 
contribution stories and assessed alternative explanations. In three of the cases (ACD, CDD 
and Aparajeyo) our analysis concluded that contribution of the SPO to the observed change 
was plausible even when the contribution of other external actors is acknowledged. In some 
cases, the SPO is forging new areas for development intervention and as a result making 
important contributions to fashioning future discourse on civil society priorities. In one of our 
cases (SUPRO) the overall contribution was deemed to be plausible. However given that 
SUPRO is a platform spread nationally, the contribution is commingled and variable. The 
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final case of AOSED was challenging because funds were not continued and the project had 
stopped at the time of evaluation.  
 
The main MDG targets, represented across the spread of SPOs considered under CS 
strengthening are related to health, gender and governance. The MDG achievements across 
the health themes (4-child mortality, 5-maternal health and 6-reduced vulnerability to disease) 
indicate a mixed picture nationally. The number of underweight children, under five mortality 
rates and infant mortality rates have been reduced through successful campaigns for 
immunization at birth in hospitals. However, child stunting and under nutrition rates remain 
alarmingly high nationally (reaching 15% and 50% in some regions, respectively). Child 
stunting, malnutrition and under nutrition vary significantly across regions with strong 
regional disparities. For example, in the Sylhet division (NE of the country), 51.3% of 
children suffered from stunting and 39.5% were underweight. Thirty-nine out of 64 districts in 
Bangladesh have stunting rates above 40%, the World Health Organisation critical threshold 
level for stunting and 55 districts are above the WHO critical threshold level for underweight 
which is 30%. This overview leads to the conclusion that the themes under which the SPOs 
are operating are highly relevant to the country context and speak to challenges which persist 
and threaten Bangladesh’s future development progress. The CIVICUS scores do not allow us 
to make a judgement on the direct impact on particular MDGs. However those working on 
health related issues have on average improved their CIVICUS scores in terms of civil society 
strengthening. This we would argue implies a positive step which will enable future progress 
in health related MDGs.  
 
As far as the gender MDG targets are concerned, recent data indicated that Bangladesh was 
performing strongly, especially in terms of closing gender gaps at the “bottom” (primary 
education) and at the “top” (political voice/representation). However since 2012, Bangladesh 
has not progressed the momentum built up over the past decade or so. Although Bangladesh 
has reached gender parity in primary education (in fact the gender disparity favours girls!), the 
Gender Parity Index (GPI) for tertiary education has moved from around 0.30 between 2001 
and 2008 to 0.39 in 2010 to 0.66 in 2011 and to 0.73 in 2012. Initiatives such as the 'Asian 
University for Women' in Chittagong, an increase in the number of scholarship and stipends 
for girl students, and the opening up of technical and vocational education are all intended to 
improve GPI. It is generally believed that poverty and hidden costs of tertiary education for 
girls contribute to ongoing gender disparity. Women’s representation in the political sphere 
appears promising (with women’s participation rate in the Parliament increasing from 12.7% 
in 1991-95 to 18.6% in 2008 and 20.0% in 2014). These rates however must be interpreted in 
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the context of policy of increasing reserved seats for women (reaching 50 in 2014). The 
Speaker of the National Parliament, the Prime Minister, the leader of the opposition and the 
Deputy leader of the house are woman.  
 
In the strengthening civil society component, we were able to look closely at MFS II 
supported interventions to improve gender equality through the Girl Power Project (GPP) 
implemented by 2 of our ‘thick’ case study SPOs (ACD and Aparajeyo) and 1 ‘thin’ case 
study BNWLA. The overall aim of these projects is to reduce gender-based violence (child 
marriage and domestic violence against young women and girls). The efforts made by the 
SPOs to build strong linkages with civil society in this challenging area are promising. The 
supervision of their work and the support provided by Plan International appears to be 
efficient at creating an intervention that produces relevant outcomes for its beneficiaries. The 
programme’s contribution to gender empowerment at the national scale is difficult to estimate 
and trace precisely because of all the reasons listed in the previous paragraph. However the 
civil society strengthening component of the GPP certainly contributes to creating dispersed 
pockets of activity and a web of progressive communities which are aware of and proactive 
against child marriage and gender-based violence. The project is effective in addressing 
underlying socio-cultural factors that make women vulnerable. In many ways, these are 
‘beacon’ projects opening up new space for civil society intervention. As such they are highly 
relevant. However tackling these kinds of issues and contributing to more impact requires 
long-term commitment from the SPOs and external funding agencies such as MFSII. In 
general, the political environment around such issues remains (often) relatively open, so that 
the challenges faced by NGOs is to make local government representatives more accountable 
for policies regarding rights of women. This refers in particular to common practices such as 
child marriage, dowry, and weak legal and social protection in the event of divorce and 
abandonment.  
 
In various parts of this narrative report, we have referred to the worsening governance 
situation in Bangladesh. At one level all civil society strengthening can be seen as an attempt 
to improve governance and the fact that we have high average scores across CIVICUS 
indicates that the SPO interventions have been effective and their activities are relevant. With 
SUPRO and ASK we had two cases of SPOs where improved and more accountable 
governance structures were the formal and direct aim of the intervention. Here we found the 
interventions to be highly relevant, and highly valued by a wide range of external stakeholders 
as well as by beneficiaries. The relevance of the types of interventions by SPOs like SUPRO 
and ASK are highly relevant to the broader development agenda (which the MDGs symbolise) 
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but are increasingly neglected. This reflects our more general observation about the difference 
between the mobilisation and the intermediation role of SPOs, and the increasing tendency to 
invest resources and energy in the latter to the detriment of the former. Although these SPOs 
have achieved different Civicus scorings (ASK +1.2 and SUPRO 0) they are both considered 
valuable interventions that should be further supported by the MFSII scheme. 
 
6.2 Conclusion 2: Linking context to findings and evaluation questions  
 
Several factors interfere with straight answers to the evaluation and attribution questions 
which are intrinsic to the programme relationships between CFAs and SPOs partners in the 
MFS11 phase. These have been: longstanding status of the SPO prior to MFS11 involvement; 
size and scale of the SPO in relation to either the funding scale or experience of the CFA to 
provide additionality; the proportion of funding and thus financial dependence of the SPO on 
its partner CFA in this phase; the maintenance of the funding flow during the period of 
measurement; turnover among CFA staff which has weakened support relationships and trust; 
stronger organisational links between the SPO and other donor or ‘parent’ INGOs rather than 
with the CFA, with influences therefore attributed to those links; and clashes of perception 
about issues of probity, corruption and competence. All of these issues limit the plausibility of 
attribution between inputs, outputs and outcomes. 
 
Nevertheless, the overall picture of the relationship between the CFAs and their partner SPOs 
during this MFS II period has been broadly positive rather than negative, with a few 
exceptions. The clearest link would appear to be in relation to the MDG outcomes, though 
again there is variation in the proportion of funding from CFA to SPO (from 100% to 11%). It 
also seems clear in the case of the MDGs that the CFA chose wisely in terms of collaboration, 
even if they were the ‘junior’ partner (e.g. in relation to Nijera Kori), indicated by design, 
competence, efficiency and efficacy. The capacity development picture has been clouded by 
funding suspensions and SPOs with much stronger links elsewhere, or long standing 
reputations and competences to which little additionality was possible. The picture is still 
more occluded in civil society strengthening, partly because the linkages between inputs, 
output activity and outcomes, especially between outputs and outcomes, is intrinsically bound 
to be a function of the behaviour of other players and stakeholders, but also substantially due 
to other externalities over which the CFA-SPO relationship has little control. This is where we 
focus these final remarks, linking the more precise evaluation questions to the wider context 
of political changes affecting civil society in Bangladesh over this study period drawn from 
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knowledge outside or beyond the findings arising from the prescribed methodologies of this 
study. 
 
Perhaps the first observation is the MDG ‘success’ noted above is part of a wider picture of 
improvements across many of the MDGs from 2000 onwards, as noted in the earlier section 
of this narrative paper under ‘relevant country context’. Many in Bangladesh and the 
development community more widely express surprise at the relative success in the country, 
despite severe ongoing problems of governance, political disruption, corruption and rent-
seeking at all levels in which NGO providers can also be implicated. These results are partly a 
function of rapid demographic change, entailing urbanisation (now @28% of the population) 
which has a positive effect upon most income and livelihood indicators. Partly therefore the 
growth of an educated middle class concerned about overall progress in the society, as a 
defence of their own more precise interests. Partly a function of relative homogeneity 
ethnically and religiously, thus reducing ‘horizontal’ exclusions. Partly a function of poorer 
people being part of wider kinship and clan groups from whom relief can be expected. Partly a 
function of both internal and international migration, entailing remittances. Partly a function 
of a substantial aid presence with some conditionality and enclave forms of management to 
insulate programmes against excessive domestic rent-seeking. Partly a function of domestic 
elites wishing to be judged and measured against the more global standards of social policy 
implied by the aid presence. And thus partly a function of government action as well an 
intermediation NGOs. 
 
A second observation which applies across all 3 components is the saturation of the civil 
society landscape in terms of formal organisations. This is not a comment about the quality 
or efficacy of civil society in Bangladesh, but about the plethora of organisations large and 
small across the country. This does not just apply to NGOs, of which there are tens of 
thousands in the country, but to other civil society entities as well (e.g. professional 
associations, public sector unions, the media and so on). In this formally observable even 
measurable sense, one could say that Bangladesh enjoyed strong social capital in the 
American political science use of the term, to which little can be added by outsiders. Indeed 
the more thoughtful donors and visiting intellectuals to Bangladesh consider themselves to be 
learners from Bangladesh rather than contributors to it. This is quite a challenge to the concept 
of ‘contribution analysis’! 
 
Thirdly, obviously in a development NGO sense, Bangladesh has been a world leader in the 
creation and sometimes innovation of these organisations. However only a small fraction of 
these NGOs receive official donor or INGO funding. Many others are funded through private 
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charities and foundations often from abroad, with very different standards, objectives and 
accountability mechanisms. Many are founded by retirees from politics, bureaucracy and 
business using their own funds and those of friends to lever in dimensions of external support. 
In some senses the NGOs are privileged in the broader civil society and not trusted nor 
particularly respected by it. Their reputation abroad can be stronger than at home. So, strong 
NGOs do not necessarily lead to strong civil society, and indeed might even weaken it or 
crowd it out. There is a clear sovereign argument to that effect within the country. So 
‘changes’ in civil society in the evaluation questions are not about some automatic linear 
progressive progression. 
 
There is therefore fourthly ongoing contestation within the notion of civil society, 
regardless of whether the state, in the form of the ruling party or military, is controlling the 
space for it. This contestation is presently enriched by the rise of Islamic organisations and 
movements, not least through the rapid rise of madrassas. These are crucial mobilisers of 
opinion about rights and appropriate cultural reference points for preferred behaviour (e.g. 
about women) at odds with the more secular narratives of western donor sponsored NGOs 
(see Wood 2009). This is a significant ‘change’ in civil society in Bangladesh, between the 
contested identities of being Bengali or Muslim, a change intensified over the last 2 years of 
the study period, affecting negatively the space or landscape for the client SPOs of Dutch 
CFAs, or at least sharpening the ‘strengthening’ agenda in opposition to an ummah and 
millenarian framing of the idea of civil society. 
 
And fifthly, the significant noise across the political landscape and thus the conditions for 
civil society over the two year interval period of this study, described earlier in the ‘relevant 
context’ section, overall weakens the explanatory and attribution links between inputs, outputs 
and outcomes in the extended results chain between MFS11 funding, CFA and SPO partners, 
and traceable outcomes. 
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Table 19: Summary of CIVICUS scoring 2012-2014 
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ACD 2012 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 +0.
2 2014 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 2 3 0 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 
ADD 2012 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 3 2 2 2 2 0 
2014 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 3 2 1 0 2 2 2 NA 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 
AOSED  2012 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 -
0.4 2014 1 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 NA 3 2 NA NA 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 2 0 
Aparaj-
eyo 
2012 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 0 
2014 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 
ASK 2012 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 +1.
2 2014 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 1 2 1 0 
BNN  2012 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 -
0.2 2014 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 2 NA 2 2 2 3 2 0 1 0 0 2 
BWLA 2012 1 0 0 3 2 1 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 +0.
4 2014 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 0 
Caritas 2012 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 
2014 1 2 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 NA 3 2 NA NA 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 0 
CDD 2012 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 +0.
2 2014 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 
CSS 2012 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 +0.
1 2014 1 2 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 0 1 2 1 0 
DSK  2012 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 0 
2014 1 2 1 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 0 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 
FPAB 2012 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 -
0.2 2014 1 2 1 2 0 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 1 0 
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PAB 2012 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 2 +0.
2 2014 2 2 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 1 0 
SUPRO 2012 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 0 
2014 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Uttaran 2012 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 +0.
2 2014 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
VARD 2012 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 -
0.2 2014 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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